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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Who Am I to You? Using Function Words as a Measure of Transference 
 
by 
 
Jon Lentz 
 
Advisor: Lissa Weinstein, Ph.D. 
 
There is a gap in our understanding of transference resolution as an aspect of therapeutic process 
and its relation to changes in language. My hypotheses can contribute to this area by identifying 
whether there are detectible changes in pronoun use in a psychoanalysis that are related to the 
resolution of transference. Data: The de-identified transcripts of a young agoraphobic housewife 
in a four time a week then two time a week psychoanalysis from the 1970s. Method: The 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software will be used to measure structural changes in 
language that may reflect intrapsychic changes in the speech patterns of a psychoanalytic patient. 
First, I will attempt to measure if there are changes in the patient’s flexible use of language. I 
will next verify that the patient’s self-reference as measured by pronoun use changes. Then other 
linguistic behavior associated with pronoun change will be identified. Finally, I will qualitatively 
explore if there is a relationship between proposed language change and transference. Findings: 
Self-reference in terms of LIWC “I” use showed major change from High I use  in the first half of 
the analysis when compared to the second half. LIWC language categories found to be 
associated with High I sessions were high affect, high “you,” high negation, high present and 
future tense, high verbs, and low “we,” low conjunctions, and low prepositions. Low I sessions 
tended to have high “we” scores, high “they” scores, high conjunctions, and low “you” scores, 
and low negation scores. When compared, the major differences between High I and Low I 
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sessions was found in the difference in pronoun use, where Low I sessions tended to be high 
“we/they” sessions and High I sessions tended to be high “you” sessions. For the qualitative 
analysis, sessions with High “I/you” scores tended to be interpreted as transference by the 
analyst, while high “we/they” scores tended to be interpreted by the analyst or patient as 
identification. 
Key Words: psychoanalysis, transference, LIWC, pronouns, functions words, self-reference, 
textual analysis, therapy process research 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction, Review of the Literature, and Hypotheses  
I. Introduction 
 
Campbell and Pennebaker’s (2003) content analysis of essays written by students and 
prisoners about traumatic incidents in order to study health improvements found that looking at 
language content, such as what the person wrote, was not predicative of improved health 
outcomes as measured by infirmary visits after diagnosis of illness. However, the authors found 
that the more that people changed their writing styles, the “how” of what they wrote rather than 
“what” they wrote, the more likely they were to visit the infirmary after diagnosis of an illness. 
The authors constructed a “styles measure,” made up of particles and function words consisting 
of prepositions, conjunctions, articles, auxiliary verbs, and pronouns, in order to measure these 
writing styles. They hypothesized that these function words can serve to help identify 
relationships between the speaker, other individuals, and objects. They used Language Semantic 
Analysis (LSA), a program that “computes coefficients of similarity between any two text 
samples in a reliable and multidimensional way (p. 60)” in order to analyze the students’ and 
prisoners’ essays. Specifically, they found that the lower the similarity rating of the essays in 
pronoun and particle use, the more likely the person was to visit the infirmary. That is, the more 
the essay style changed, the more likely they were to have improved health outcomes.   
 The authors argued that coming to terms with a traumatic experience, especially a social 
trauma, was linked to changing thinking about oneself in relation to others and that this change 
in thinking can be measured by the change in function word usage. They write, “The LSA 
analyses have starkly demonstrated that different clusters of pronouns describe different social 
realities or different lenses through which our participants saw their worlds (Campbell and 
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Pennebaker, 2003, p. 64).” The authors believe that using this paradigm could have important 
implications for clinical research.  
Psychoanalysis has a long history of thinking of “oneself in relation to others (Campbell 
and Pennebaker, 2003, p. 64)” and many authors would call this social lens “object relations” 
and its clinical manifestation “transference” (Freud, 1912). Transference is defined by Freud 
(1912) as the unconscious repetition of infantile relationships “transferred” onto the analyst and 
contemporary relationships. More recent investigators have called this and similar phenomena 
internal working models of attachment (Bowlby, 1969), representations of interactions that have 
been generalized (Stern, 1985), emotional schemas (Bucci, 1997) and cyclical psychodynamics 
(Wachtel, 2008). Part of the goal of an analysis is to bring these repetitions to the conscious 
awareness of the patient. Many analytic thinkers conceptualize this relationship between self, 
other, and reality in terms of pronouns (Lacan, 1954; Winnicott, 1958; Kernberg, 1987; Butler, 
2003; Ogden, 2001).  
Based on the implicit linking of pronouns and transference by the above authors, this 
thesis will examine whether pronoun and function word usage could be a way to measure 
therapeutic process.  Utilizing Pennebaker and Campbell’s (2003) method, I will examine the  
therapeutic process in a psychoanalytic therapy focused on transference interpretations. I argue 
that mental health status is correlated with the linguistic style, as measured by pronoun usage and 
function word use. Next, I will examine if there are other linguistic categories that are associated 
with those changes. Finally, a qualitative examination of the session material will be used to 
ascertain if there is a relationship between transference and the hypothesized changes in 
language structure.  
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 The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count Software as developed by Pennebaker, Booth, 
and Francis (2007) will be used to count pronouns and function words in order to measure 
structural changes within the analysis. This software will be applied to select sessions from the 
database containing the complete transcripts containing the full analysis of A2, a Midwestern 
housewife in a psychoanalysis, focused primarily on transference interpretations. The literature 
review will examine the theoretical and empirical work that has informed the development of my 
hypotheses. First, the theory of the resolution of transference as a constructive treatment goal 
will be examined in order to demonstrate that transference could be used as a potential measure 
of therapeutic process in the analysis of A2. In the second section, the work of researchers that 
have argued for linguistic structure to be used to examine therapeutic process will be examined. 
The literature review indicates that there is a gap in our understanding of looking at the process 
of transference resolution as an aspect of therapeutic process in an analytic treatment as it relates 
to function word use. My hypotheses can contribute to this area by identifying whether function 
word usage in an analysis is related to the resolution of the transference. 
 
Transference: A History of the Concept and Role in Treatment 
In this section, I will go over a very brief history of the term transference, how it has 
evolved, and briefly cover some of the current thinking around the term. Though 
countertransference will be touched on, other aspects of the transference such as the therapeutic 
alliance and other potential mechanisms of therapeutic change will not be reviewed as it is 
outside the purview of this paper. Controversies around the accuracy, frequency, or timing of a 
transference interpretation will be examined in the empirical literature section. The section will 
focus on the transference as it relates to psychopathology and the changes in theory that have 
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developed over the history of the term, organized by Harry Smith’s (2003) terms for broad and 
narrow views of the transference. 
Freud’s attitude towards transference fluctuated through-out his theory, and different 
thinkers have focused on these different moments of fluctuation to extrapolate different positions 
in regards to transference. Freud (1895) first mentions transference in the analysis of Anna O. in 
her reaction to Breur, noting that it is a situation where the patient places wishes and feelings 
from a previous object onto the physician. Transference as we know it today was described in 
order to explain the failure of Freud’s treatment of Dora (1905): 
 What are transferences? They are new editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and 
phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they 
have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier 
person by the person of the physician. To put it another way: a whole series of psychological 
experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the physician at the 
present moment. (p.106) 
 
 At first, Freud placed his idea of transference as a resistance to treatment following his 
adherence to a “resistance analysis” (Strachey, 1934). Freud’s focus of the work of analysis was 
to make the “unconscious conscious” (Strachey, 1934, p. 67), and to induce the patient to 
remember repressed memories that were acted out in symptoms. As Freud’s theory developed, 
the goal of this type of analysis began to change in focus from remembering the traumatic event 
to analyzing the resistance to remembering the traumatic event that fixated the patient in a 
certain psychosexual developmental stage (Hamilton, 1992). Transference was seen at this time 
as part of that resistance (Strachey, 1934). 
As his theory developed, Freud (1916) would argue at times that resolving the 
transference was the key goal of treatment, where "the transference, which, whether affectionate 
or hostile, seemed in every case to constitute the greatest threat to the treatment, becomes its best 
tool (p. 496)." A year later Freud, (1917) would state: 
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 The decisive part of the work is achieved by creating in the patient's relation to the 
doctor in the ‘transference’ new editions of the old conflicts; in these the patient would like to 
behave in the same way as he did in the past, while we, by summoning up every available mental 
force [in the patient], compel him to come to a fresh decision. Thus the transference becomes the 
battlefield on which all the mutually struggling forces should meet one another. (p. 454) 
 
 Rather than transference serving to undermine the treatment, the facilitation of the 
“transference neurosis,” where libido is cathected on the person of the analyst, and those infantile 
over stimulations or understimulations that lead to the onset of neurosis is now worked through 
with the positive alliance of the ego (positive transference). This working through becomes an 
avenue to a new resolution to the old conflicts in the “actual and immediate situation” with the 
analyst (Strachey, 1934, p. 68). Henry Smith (2003) argues that from Freud’s original 
hypothesis, there emerged two different schools of thought in North American thinking about 
transference, and which he terms the narrow view and the broad view. Ego psychology, as 
developed from Freud’s structural model and Anna Freud’s description of “defense analysis” 
(1936) would come to dominate the North American scene up until the 1970’s,  and represents 
the origins of the more narrow view (Smith, 2003).  
Anna Freud (1936) in her development of what would become ego psychology, and in 
her continuation of one interpretation of Freud’s theories, represents the origins of the narrow 
view of transference (Smith, 2003). In Ego psychology, interpreting the id impulses of Classical 
analysis become less important than the transference of defenses related to keeping those 
impulses from the ego’s awareness (A. Freud, 1936). It is not the impulses themselves, but the 
defenses against those impulses that then become the primary goal of analysis. The development 
of the “transference neurosis” (Gill, 1954) is the goal of treatment in this formulation, and 
defenses against the transference neurosis developing are themselves interpreted. As it came to 
dominate the North American scene, Gill (1954) sums up the therapeutic action of American ego 
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psychoanalysis: “Psychoanalysis is that technique which, employed by a neutral analyst, results 
in the development of a regressive transference neurosis and the ultimate resolution of this 
neurosis by interpretation alone (p. 774).” The analyst presents a “blank slate” so that the 
analyst’s personality does not interfere with the development of the transference. 
Countertransference in this model is “essentially a contaminant, distracting and potentially 
dangerous” (Mitchell, 1993, p. 145). However, this is a far more narrow view than something 
closer to a middle ground that Strachey (1934) proposed. 
 Strachey (1934) outlines the structure of the therapeutic action of transference and the 
use of “mutative interpretations” where the analyst, acting as an “auxiliary super-ego” gives their 
permission to release a small amount of id energy to become conscious: 
Since the analyst is also, from the nature of things, the object of the patient’s id impulses, the 
quantity of these impulses which is now released into consciousness will become consciously 
directed toward the analyst…If all goes well, the patient’s ego will become aware of the contrast 
between the aggressive character of his feelings and the real nature of the analyst, who does not 
behave like the patient’s “good” or “bad” archaic objects. The patient…will become aware of a 
distinction between his archaic fantasy object and the real external object. (p. 73) 
 
Strachey, in this formulation of “present moment” mutative interpretations foretells 
certain theorists (Lowewald, 1960, Gill, 1979, and Kernberg, 1983) in the prescribing of “here 
and now” interpretations informed by past conflicts. Being also “the object of the patient’s id 
impulses” will become an important point in the changing attitude towards counter-transference.  
The origins of what Smith (2003) terms the broad view of transference originates with 
Klein (1946). Klein has a different model for the developmental origin of transference, one she 
places in the “preoedipol” relations of the infant to its mother and where the Oedipal structure of 
ego, superego, and id can be described as a developmental achievement. This changes the 
emphasis from a classical focus on tension between conflicts and drives and into the difficulty of 
projective identification. Projective identification, by which an infant “puts into” the mother 
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unconscious fantasies, thoughts, and feelings, can elicit behavior in the mother or the analyst 
(Klein, 1946). This problematizes the idea of the “blank slate” of classical analysis. Counter-
transference, originally postulated as the analyst’s own unanalyzed neurotic conflicts (Mitchel, 
1993), can now potentially be thought of as clues to what the patient is projecting into the 
analyst.  In this view of transference, Klein (1952) argues the infant’s first object relation to the 
mother’s breast is a split object relation between the gratification and frustration offered by the 
breast. The object remains split in a the “schizoid position,” with both idealized and devalued 
representations, and it is only in the Oedipal stage when the infant is able to enter the “depressive 
position,” where the infant’s ego is able to synthesize those destructive impulses aimed at a 
“loved person” (Klein, 1952, p. 434). Klein then proposes a “total transference” situation, where 
rather than understanding transference in terms of direct reference to the analyst, Klein’s (1952) 
conception of transference “…as rooted in the earliest stages of development and in deep layers 
of the unconscious is much wider and entails a technique by which from the whole material 
presented the unconscious elements of the transference are deduced (p. 437).” The major 
suggestion of Klein then is that a pre-Oedipal transference is not so much projected onto the 
analyst as much as projected into the analyst, eliciting ego alien thoughts, feelings, and fantasies 
in the analyst as the analyst comes to house unwanted parts of the patient’s own projected self.  
Bion (1967) continued this idea of projection in developing his theory of Alpha and Beta 
elements. In normal development, the infant is not able to comprehend the signals his or her 
body sends in the form of Beta Elements. These elements are evacuated into the mother whom in 
reverie, makes sense of these Beta elements using her Alpha function, and feeds them back  to 
the infant for reintrojection as Alpha elements. The mother, in this way, makes sense of the 
infant’s experience of its own body and gives the infant back that experience so that the infant 
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can internalize that understanding and make sense of its own experience. These alpha elements 
then become the basis for the infant’s own alpha function, where she or he is able to receive 
information about the body and translate it into Alpha elements, there by making meaning of his 
or her experience. If the infant feels as if she or he is dying for example, and the mother refuses 
the projective identification, the infant “therefore reintrojects, not a fear of dying made tolerable, 
but a nameless dread (Bion, 1967, p. 116).”  The therapeutic action in this model then comes 
from the analyst “containing” affect for the patient. The analyst “digests the projected material 
and feeds that transformed material back to the patient, as a mother would do for an infant. 
Rather than reintrojecting the unnamable affect over and over again, the affect is named and 
reinternalized as knowable. The role of the analyst is to “contain” these affects for the patient 
and often come through the analyst’s utilizing their fantasy material as a mother would review 
their own reverie to understand their patient (Bion, 1967).  
Between the narrow and the broad view of the transference, Loewald takes something of 
the middle ground. The resolution of the distortion caused by fantasies, and the consequent 
restructuring of the personality, is the therapeutic work of psychoanalysis (Loewald, 1960). 
Loewald (1960) outlines what he views as the “therapeutic action” of psychoanalysis as it relates 
to transference. He marks the move from classical interpretations of analytic work in the 
development of what he calls the “new object” of the analyst, where the analyst acts as a 
mediator between the fantasy of the relationship and the reality of the relationship. Loewald 
argues that the action of analysis in regards to transference takes place in the new object of the 
analyst:  
It should be apparent that a view of transference which stresses the need of the 
unconscious for transference, for a point of attachment at transference in the preconscious, by 
which primary process is transformed into secondary process-implies the notion that psychic 
health has to do with an optimal, although by no means necessarily conscious, communication 
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between unconscious and preconscious, between infantile, archaic stages and structures of the 
psychic apparatus and its later stages and structures of organization...Where repression is lifted 
and unconscious and preconscious are again in communication, infantile object and 
contemporary object may be united into one-a truly new object as both unconscious and 
preconscious are changed in mutual communication. (pg. 31)  
 
The analyst does this by acting as a mediator of this union and by becoming a “new 
object”-free from the distortions of transference. And through this, rather than the blank slate or 
neutral mirror of a classical analysis, Loewald (1960) argues that “the essence of such new object 
relationship is the opportunity they offer for rediscovery of early paths of the development of 
object-relations, leading to a new way of relating to objects as well as of being and relating to 
oneself (p.17).” By the analyst bringing to consciousness the ways in which the analysand is 
attempting to unconsciously recreate and repeat a previous relationship, the analyst helps to 
facilitate ego development into a higher level of organization. This seems to be a middle road 
between the broad and the narrow view of transference (Smith, 2003), and it is interesting to note 
how little different he sounds from Strachey (1934) writing nearly thirty years before him.  
Loewald’s “middle road” represents a moderate view from others who took more 
“radical” changes in thinking in the American psychoanalytic scene. Racker (1948) began to 
argue for the importance of countertransference not as detrimental to therapeutic process, but as 
useful information where the analyst becomes an object of the distortions of transference as well 
as the interpreter of that transference. The move to focus on interpersonal processes rather than 
drive continued with thinkers like Sullivan (1953) who argued for the resolution of “parataxic 
distortions” in the interpersonal field between the analyst and patient. Sullivan (1953) argued 
against an object relations view made up of fantasied and distorted representations and focused 
on the real objects in a patient’s life. Kohut (1971), in self psychology, would continue this 
focus, moving away from a Freudian model in the treatment of narcissism. Other thinkers would 
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move the therapeutic action away from interpretation. Franz Alexander (1951) would argue for 
the “corrective emotional experience” in analysis, where the analyst could provide the patient 
with what they missed relationally in order to facilitate health. Bowlby (1969) moved to direct 
observation of children and developed an alternative motivational system to the drives in 
developing a motivational system in attachment. These interpersonal trends would combine with 
the British Object Relations theory to form the American relational movement (Mitchell 1983) as 
would Merton Gill’s change in view regarding transference (Kernberg, 2001).  
Merton Gill, according to Mitchell (1983) and Wachtel (2008), represents both sides of 
the narrow/broad debate. Originally, Gill (1951, 1954) was the spokesperson for a “narrow view” 
of the transference. However, Gill (1978, 1982) takes the interpret transference early and often 
route in citing Rapaport’s (1967) argument that transference and resistance are always 
interpersonal phenomena, and as such he argued for the resolution of transference through “here 
and now” interpretations and interpreting them early and often (Gill, 1978). Gill (1978) cites 
Freud (1914) to make the argument for a broad view of transference:  
the theory of psychoanalysis is an attempt to account for two striking and unexpected 
facts of observation whenever an attempt is made to trace the symptoms of a neurotic back to 
their sources in his past life: the facts of transference and of resistance…anyone who takes up 
other sides of the problem while avoiding these two hypotheses will hardly escape a charge of 
misappropriation of property by attempted impersonation, if he persists in calling himself a 
psychoanalyst. (p.16)  
 
Gill, in his later thinking, strongly argues that transference, rather than being an infantile 
“distortion,” is instead a particular perspective on the part of the patient that has developed from 
past experiences and that the patient has not questioned (Wachtel, 2008). Gill also argues against 
the very technical neutrality he once argued for, stating that is it is a “myth” that may lead to 
emotional deprivation, but may not be a better technical position (Wachtel, 2008). Gill’s 
argument for a more interpersonal/relational view moves the structural change from a focus on 
11 
 
intrapsychic processes to focus more on interpersonal processes, including the analyst’s own 
process (Mitchell, 1983).  
However, relational thinkers would make moves to distinguish themselves from object 
relations thinkers. Mitchell (1983), for example, is critical of certain object relations thinkers in 
what he describes as their devotion to the “developmental tilt” of their argument. Using the 
developmental tilt, he argues that certain object relations thinkers are able to hold onto parts of 
Freud’s drive theory in increasing “distortions” of that theory. Mitchell (1983) is also highly 
critical of calling what he sees as normal aspects of relatedness “infantile” and belonging to 
“infantile urges.” He becomes concerned that this trend may lead to seeing the client as infantile 
and fragile. Transference then is not an infantile distorted projection, but an immediate aspect of 
the way the patient relates to others, including the analyst (Mitchell, 1983). Wachtel (2008) 
illustrates this as the two person model rather than the one person model of classical analysis and 
describes the change in relation to transference.  
The unconscious is a one person conception par excellence, something waiting inside to 
be discovered. In contrast, concern with unconscious processes, with the way in which so much 
of what constitutes psychological life proceeds without awareness, is perfectly compatible with a 
two person critique. We do not ‘discover’ or uncover what has been there all along. Rather we 
engage in processes of construction (and co-construction) which helps bring forth and articulate 
experiences in a dynamic, constantly evolving fashion. (p. 24)  
 
Other relational thinkers have argued that rather than a two person model, a three person 
model is needed (Altman, 1995). The analytic third then becomes transference based on culture, 
race, and socio economic status. To conclude, Kernberg (2001) argues that in the English 
speaking schools of psychoanalysis, that the contemporary “mainstream” is made up from 
Kleinian, contemporary Freudian, and British independent sources and that the other major 
school of thought is the intersubjectivist-interpersonal-self psychology-relational school.  
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Though this is a very summary overview of the evolution of transference, I traced the 
history of the concept from a one person drive theory model of transference to a two person 
interpersonal process oriented model. With the rejection of Freud’s metapsychology by the 
majority of practitioners and a call for empirical verification of parts of his theory (Hart, 1985) I 
will argue that function words are a way to measure transference in the process as well as the 
outcome of an analysis. However, the relationship between a theoretical structure of analysis and 
function words, specifically pronouns, will first be explicated.  
 
The Structure of Transference: I and Me and You  
In developing a theoretical argument for the use of pronouns and function words, the 
development of the structure of transference will now be explored in relation to function words 
and especially pronouns. I argue that given psychoanalytic stress on speaking in the “talking 
cure,” it is important to consider the self as a linguistic metaphor. Kernberg (1982) for his part 
looks to Strachey’s early translations of Freud and remarks that Strachey mistranslated Freud’s 
structural theory in terms of ego, super ego, and id, where the “ego” in the original German is 
“I.” Freud (1923) defined the ego, or the “das ich” or “I,” as being “first and foremost a body ego 
(p. 26)” constructed from experiences of the body, serving as a representation of bodily 
experiences in mind. Freud (1923) in some ways supports Kernberg’s (1987) position that drives 
are organized through object relations when he states that “the character of the ego is a 
precipitate of abandoned object cathexes and that it contains the history of those object choices 
(Freud, 1923, p. 638).” However, in the developmental link between an internal experience of 
the body and an experience from the body as viewed outside the self, Lacan (1953) looks to 
“Mirror stage” as formative of the “I” function. 
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Lacan (1953) makes this argument in describing his emphasis on the structure of 
language as offering clues to the function of the ego, where in both passive and active 
constructions, “I am beating the dog,” versus “the dog is being beaten by me,” there is a person 
speaking and “…in either case, [the subject] asserts himself as an object involved in a 
relationship of some sort, whether one of feeling or doing. Does what is expressed in such 
statements of the ego give us a picture of the relationship of the subject to reality?” (Lacan, 1953, 
p. 11) I believe the answer to this rhetorical question is yes. Lacan (1953) argues for a “mirror 
stage” where the infant becomes fascinated by its image in a mirror, seeing itself from outside 
itself, typifying “an essential libidinal relationship with the body image” (p. 14). While Lacan 
has a different etiology and approach to transference, I am more interested in the birth of the self 
and its relation to language that he describes where through “I” the ego situates itself in 
relationship to reality.  
Thinking in terms of Bion (1967) in the projection and re-introjection of affect changed 
by the Alpha Function, the baby then internalizes the Alpha function from its mother, and 
through this process recognizes (or misrecognizes) its body and bodily urges. Ogden (1992) is 
more clear when he defines object representations as containing both sides of an object relation, 
both mother and infant: “This is so because an internal object relationship consists of a 
relationship between two unconscious aspects of the patient, one identified with the self and the 
one identified with the object in the original relationship” (p. 236). These objects and the 
analyst’s own objects, make up the transference/countertransference phenomena (Ogden, 1992). 
Lacan (1953) presents this moment as the mirror stage where the infant comes to recognize 
themselves though the “orthopedic of the mother” and Winnicott (1958), as I will discuss later, 
uses the “mother’s face” rather than a mirror to “see” and recognize itself outside of the self. 
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This is important for three reasons, as it sets the foundation  for the infant to learn to regulate 
their own bodily homeostasis through internalizing the mother, that there is an object 
representation of self in relation to another,  and that this internalization will serve as the basis 
for regulating the homeostasis of self in relation to other. It is also the “matrix of transference 
and countertransference” (Ogden, 2001, p. 236). However, as clinical encounters occur in 
language, it will be important to understand how transference develops in the linguistic field. 
Judith Butler (2005) uses pronouns to describe the object relational foundation of the structure of 
transference.  
Judith Butler (2005) describes transference in its relationship to certain structures of the 
self in the scene of “I” addressing “you.” She defines transference as taking place particularly in 
the analytic “scene of address,” and in a way that echoes Loewald’s (1960) argument for what 
constitutes the therapeutic action of analysis and Gill’s (1978) emphasis on the current 
relationship. “Transference is thus the recreation of primary relationality within the analytic 
space, one that potentially yields a new or altered relationship (and capacity for relationship) on 
the basis of analytic work” (p. 51). She comments specifically on the linguistic nature of 
transference, where “narrative functions within the context of transference not only as a means 
by which information is conveyed but as a rhetorical deployment of language that seeks to act 
upon the other, motivated by a desire or wish that assumes an allegorical form in the 
interlocutory scene of the analysis… (Author’s italics, p. 51).” She then uses this to argue against 
the idea of psychoanalysis as solely a narrative reconstruction of the subject, as she argues that 
the “other” of address, the “you,” is there from the beginning, “in the place of where the ego will 
be (p. 52)” and it is the resolution of this transference that reduces distortion, or that need to act 
upon the other in order to recreate the original scene of address. “So the point of the transference 
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and countertransference is not only to build or rebuild the story of one’s life but also to enact 
what cannot be narrated, and to enact the unconscious as it is relived in the scene of address itself 
(p. 52).” Where, “The ego does not come into being without prior encounter, a primary relation, 
and a set of inaugural impressions from elsewhere (p. 58).” Winnicott (1967) would argue that 
this scene is at least initiated by the mother, and the mother as mirror.  
Winnicott, for his part and in Butler’s (2005) thinking, “describes the ego as a relational 
process” which disputes the notion that “the ego is constituted and there from the outset of life 
(Butler, 2005, p. 58).” Winnicott (1958) does this through his description of the development of 
the “matrix of transference” (p. 418) in studying the words “I am alone,” where “ego immaturity 
is naturally balanced by ego support” by the mother of the infant. This marks the achievement of 
differentiating the “me” from “not me” aspects of the world (Abram, 1996) and marks the 
emergence from merger with the environment. “First, there is the word ‘I,’ implying emotional 
growth. Integration is a fact. The external world is repudiated and an internal world has become 
possible” (p. 417). This serves as the ego nuclei. Next comes the ‘I am,’ which the individual can 
only achieve “if there is an environment which is protective,” where the protective environment 
“is in fact the mother preoccupied with her own infant and oriented to the infant’s ego 
requirements through her identification with her own infant” (p. 418.). This is similar to the 
Kleinian depressive position or Winnicott’s stage of concern (Abram, 1996). However the infant 
continues to be unaware of the mother until the development of the “I am alone” phase. This 
development depends “on the infant’s awareness of the continued existence of a reliable mother 
whose reliability makes it possible for the infant to “enjoy being alone, for a limited period” (p. 
418). This “capacity to be alone,” born from the paradox that this capacity to be alone comes 
from being alone in the presence of someone, marks the onset of object relations not solely 
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determined by id impulses, but by what Winnicott called “ego relatedness” (p. 416, 1958). The 
mother then, as mirror and container of the infant plays an intrinsic role to the development of 
the ego in interpersonal relationships, setting up a template for later relations. The mother/ child 
relationship is in fact the relationship between the infant’s needs and the mother’s ability to meet 
those needs in a “good enough” way. However, in order to achieve this level of ego relatedness 
in “object usage,” the infant has to be able to use the mother “ruthlessly,” in the confirmation of 
another paradox of Winnicott’s (1969): “the baby creates the object but the object was there 
waiting to be created and to become a cathected object” (pg. 712). That is, like Loewald’s (1960) 
“new object,” beyond the infant’s projections, or the patient’s transference distortions, there is a 
person waiting to be found.   
This brings two important points of thought for Winnicott; the role of the mother as 
mirror and the idea of the transitional play space. Winnicott cites Lacan’s (1934) “Mirror stage,” 
Lacan’s scene of the birth of the ego, but Winnicott cites the mother’s face as preceding the 
mirror for the baby. The mother as mirror becomes internalized as a structure of the self-as the 
initial boundary between self and other in the first “not me” mediated by transitional space. 
These two parts of the self, the body and its needs and the body as objectified and taken care of 
by the mother, the preconscious and conscious of Loewald (1960), or the symbolic and 
subsymbolic of Bucci (2007) or the “I” and the “me” of Ogden (2001) is mediated by a 
transitional space (1953), or  
The intermediate area…that is allowed to the infant between primary creativity and 
objective perception based on reality testing [author’s italics]. The transitional phenomena 
represent the early stages of the use of illusion, without which there is no meaning for the human 
being in the idea of a relationship with an object that is perceived by others as external to that 
being.” (p. 94) 
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In analysis, this transitional space is the space of language (Favero & Ross, 2003). The 
transitional space of language occurs where “…Words may create an intermediate area between 
reality and fantasy, public and private meaning, secondary and primary process thinking…words 
may become hypercathected …(p. 288)” and may be similar in meaning to what Freud posits as 
the “overdetermined” language of dreams (2004), the “polysemy” of Lacan, or the “metaphor” of 
Ogden (2001). As Ogden thinks of this relationship in terms of pronoun use, it is worth taking a 
closer look at his theoretical structure.   
Ogden (2001) is most explicit, and for the sense of argument of the self as an interplay 
between subject and as the object of another person: 
 
With metaphor, we say one thing in terms of another, or as Frost (1930) liked to put it metaphor 
is a way of "saying one thing and meaning another (p. 719)." Without metaphor, we are stuck in 
a world of surfaces whose meanings cannot be reflected upon. Self-reflective thought occurs 
when "I" (as subject) look at "me" (as object). Metaphor is a form of language in which I 
describe "me" so that "I" might see myself. In an important sense, naming and describing "me" 
metaphorically creates both "I" and "me" as interdependent aspects of human self-awareness 
(human subjectivity). In other words, the individual (as object) is invisible to the self (as subject) 
until metaphors for "I" are used to describe/ create "me" so that "I" can see myself. This is the 
mutually creating dialectic of "I" and "me." To put it still another way: "I" as subject do not exist 
until I can see myself ("me" as object); and the individual (like a tree falling in the forest) is 
silent/ invisible unless there is a subjective "I" to hear and see it. The event that creates both "I" 
and "me" is an event mediated by language in general and by metaphorical language in 
particular. (p. 36-37). 
 
In this way, the “I” and “me” exist together and are linked by language. The “me” that is 
formed in the matrix of transference as described by Winnicott (1958) and mediated by the 
mother is a space of “necessary illusion” and it is this objectification of the “me” which is 
projected on to the other (or the “you” in the “I” and “you” of Butler, 2005) that constitutes the 
elements of transference. Self-reflection occurs in the “me” aspects of the self-becoming visible 
to the “I,” after the transference that can’t be narrated is enacted with the analyst, who somehow 
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communicates the unconscious projection to the patient. Transference is in some ways an attempt 
to turn the other into the archaic objectifier of the “me,” (or the “you” of the original scene of 
address (Butler, 2005)), aspect of the personality, the “other” as objectifier of the “I”, replete 
with the original fantasies. The interpretation of the transference leads to the understanding of 
the “I” to the “me” as object, the way that the “me” was objectified in an archaic relationship by 
the mother reflecting the infant back. I read Ogden as arguing that through the process of 
analytic reflection and through the elucidation of the way language is acting upon the other 
(Butler, 2005), the subject’s “I” takes over the function of the objectification of the “me,” as 
mediated by language and originally “invisible.”  
I(other/mirror/mother) me=external reality, Where the “I” and “me’s” relationship is 
invisible in the “original scene of address.” 
I (“you”/analyst) “me”= external reality, where the analyst gets in the way of an 
invisible circuit that is re/creating “new editions” of the old relationship.  
The “new object” (Loewald, 1960) posits a different object relation, one self-aware of the 
transference distortion. To reiterate, in this model of an object relation, there is the self (I) in 
relation to an objectification (me) that is projected onto the analyst through transference (you). 
The relationship within the self is related via metaphor, or the transitional play space, a play area 
between internal and external, subject and object that is originally the space between the baby’s 
internal needs and the external mother’s recognition (or misrecognition) of those needs. The 
structure of language, as illuminated through function words becomes important then in the way 
the analysand attempts to act on the analyst in order to recreate an archaic object relationship. In 
function words, rather than in content words, there is a discernible structure that can be measured 
according to Pennebaker’s (2003) method, as the “I” attempts to act on the “you” of the present 
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reality through the “me” of transference to see “me” externally as I was once seen and objectified 
in the “original scene of address.”  
Using function words, then, which implicitly suggest a relational position between the 
speaker and the listener in the “scene of address” (Butler, 2005), provides a natural way to 
examine where the speaker places themselves and where they are positioning the listener in 
accordance with archaic object relations. By looking at the “how” something is said, rather than 
“what” is said can become a natural way to observe unconscious object relations and the seeking 
by the speaker to position the listener in an archaic relationship. Due to the repetitive nature of 
transference, this should manifest in a certain rigidity of certain function word use as the patient 
attempts to rhetorically locate the analyst in a “new edition” of a previous style of relating.  
 
Empirical Studies of Related Paradigms 
 While Freud’s theory has been difficult to operationalize (Bucci, 1997), similar 
paradigms to object relations have been more amendable to empirical investigation. Bowlby’s 
(1969) theory of internal working models of attachment is one such theory, and provides 
important methodological considerations in the linguistic study of relations from the Adult 
Attachment Interview (Steele & Steele, 2008).     
Bowlby’s (1969) concept of internal working models of attachment bypasses the dual 
drive theory of Freud and is based on a different motivational system of the young child wishing 
to maintain proximity to an adult caregiver. Bowlby (1969) argues that as in the “traditional 
model” of psychoanalysis, “much psychopathology is regarded as being due to models that are 
greater or less degree inadequate or inaccurate” (p. 82). These internal working models, much 
like object relations internalized from caretakers as “stimulus barrier” (Freud, 1917), act to 
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regulate the organism and alert it to danger. However, they also act to help the organism 
maintain homeostatic equilibrium, where the organism uses these models in order to return to a 
homeostatic equilibrium after the activation of the attachment system and are separate but 
equally important too sex and feeding systems. These attachment patterns have been empirically 
studied by the strange situation (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) and divided into 
secure and insecure forms of attachment, and organized and disorganized modes of attachment 
(Hesse & Main, 2000). These forms have been empirically studied through the use of the 
“strange situation” as well as the Adult Attachment Interview, which has been recommended for 
use in clinical settings (Steele & Steele, 2008).     
The AAI measures flexible versus inflexible attention while the attachment system is 
activated (Main, 2000). She argues that securely attached children present flexible attention “in 
that the infant readily alters the focus of its attention as circumstances change, the insecure forms 
may rest upon specific kinds of restrictions in attentional and behavior patterning” (pg. 1077) 
and this inflexibility of attention will manifest when adults discuss attachment related 
experiences. As it goes, those judged to be “secure autonomous” in attachment style are in their 
narratives able to balance a deep caring for the attachment related experience but maintain some 
objectivity about the attachment relationship. The speech in these narratives “is strikingly fresh 
and original” (pg. 1079) and maintains coherence. In those dismissing of attachment experiences, 
the language was often short and the content contradictory as the speaker inflexibly avoided 
topics that may induce anxiety or anger from remembering attachment related events. Those in 
the preoccupied category talked angrily about their attachment experiences and rather than short, 
the narratives were often long, showing them to be inflexibly focused on the caregiver (Maine, 
2000).  
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Flexibility is the key, as Campbell and Pennebaker (2003) argue that flexibility in 
function word usage across journal entries predicted health outcomes. Theoretically, insecurely 
attached people would be inflexible in function word use while secure people would be more 
flexible in function word use, as they would not need to defensively manage attentional focus in 
their reports. Fonagy and Target (2000) similarly argue for rigidity of self in relation to others as 
an indicator of psychopathology. However, others have looked more closely at transference 
specifically in analytic process research.   
 
Analytic Process Research  
 During the seventies, eighties, and nineties, several measures of transference were 
defined and studied in therapeutic process research (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1988; Gill& 
Hoffman, 1982; Teller & Dahl, 1986; Waldron et al., 2004). Luborsky’s and Crits-Christoph’s 
(1993) Core Conflictual Relationship Theme (CCRT) was developed by the author examining 
transcripts and finding three prominent components to each narrative. The first component was 
comprised of what the patient wanted or wished from other people, the second was how the other 
people reacted, and the third component was then how the patient reacted to the other people’s 
reactions. Core Conflictual Relationship Themes were then extracted in a multipart part system 
where judges extracted the above three components from relationship episodes in the patient’s 
narratives to create a glossary of core conflictual relationship themes. The judges would look for 
CCRT conflicts that originated with an early parent figure. The judges would then look for 
examples of CCRTs that came to involve the therapist. They compared their method to Freud’s 
concept of transference, and used data from the CCRT to objectively measure the accuracy of 
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therapist’s transference interpretations. They found that while wishes did not change, the 
expected reaction of others did show change during the course of treatment.  
PERT, or the Patient’s Experience of the Relationship with the Therapist (Gill and 
Hoffman, 1982) coded disguised allusions as well as more overt references to the relationship 
with the analyst. The system focused on the degree to which the therapist’s interventions deal 
with the patient’s experience of the relationship and provided a way to track the transference and 
the effectiveness of transference interpretations. It could also be used to track transference and 
countertransference enactments as measured by a judge in which the analyst is unaware of the 
enactment.  
Teller and Dahl (1986), in the Fundamental Repetitive and Maladaptive Emotion 
Structures (FRAMES) developed a way to use content analysis while working with transcripts of 
analyses. Dahl came up with the measure when he began to notice repetitive structures in 
sessions with his analytic patients. Teller and Dahl described a “FRAME” as an event sequence 
structure observed from their patients, where the events are variable mental events like acting, 
wishing, or knowing. These events are listed in sequential order from the session material. The 
analyst is then able to observe the movement from one frame to another without the 
predetermined categories of the CCRT and PERT. Through this, the analyst can track the 
progress of the patient’s internal memories of a wide range of wishes, defenses, and emotions.  
Waldron and his colleagues (Waldron et al., 2004) created the Analytic Process Scales 
containing fourteen patient variables and eighteen analyst variables in a manualized format. The 
researchers first divided analytic sessions into segments delineated by who was speaking (the 
patient or the analyst). The sessions were then scored using a five point Likert scale by a group 
of judges. They used variables to assess the type of analyst contribution (clarification, 
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interpretation, elaboration) and the aim of the analyst contribution (does the analyst address 
defenses, transference, or conflicts). Judges then assess the involvement of the analyst, and rate 
the quality of the analyst’s contribution. The scales have a high rate of inter-rater reliability, 
supporting good internal validity. In one study using three prerecorded analyses, (Waldron et al., 
2004b), they found the strongest analyst variable influencing patient productivity where patient 
productivity was judged on a five point scale for assessing their progress in understanding, 
collaboration in the analyses, and emotional involvement was in fact the quality of the 
intervention that preceded it, rather than the type of intervention. They argue from this finding 
that the quality rather than type of intervention suggests that “attunement to the patient’s present 
state, the choice of an effective intervention, and its timing and tactfulness are most important to 
the progress of the analysis-refuting any suggestion that interpretation in general is necessarily 
more helpful then clarification, or that analysis of transference is necessarily more helpful than 
analyzing resistance (pg. 1105).” 
To sum up, the PERT, CCRT, and APS use clinician-determined categories in order to 
view transference phenomena, while the FRAMES system is more subjectively focused in that 
the subjectivity of the patient determines the frames created. The Analytic Process Scale 
however is unique for two reasons in that the analyst is rated along with the patient and in that it 
is manualized. Though these measures are clinically useful, they do not evaluate or assess the 
underlying structure of language used. As the flexibility of attention on the AAI (Main, 2000) 
suggests, there may be measurable underlying linguistic structures that reflect different relational 
pattern organizations that can be measured.  
Noting the difficulties and contradictions of operationalizing Freud’s structural theory, 
Wilma Bucci (2002) has examined changes in process therapy using multiple code theory. Bucci 
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(2010) sums up some of the commonality of different ways object relations have been 
empirically investigated in her description of emotional schemas, which she defines as “psychic 
structures that shape our individual personalities, and influence the way we interact with other 
people, experience our emotions, and interpret our reactions” (p.771).  Bucci, 1998 posits that 
schematic representations of this nature are similar to Bowlby’s (1969) concept of internal 
working models, or Stern’s (1985) concept of representations of interactions that have been 
generalized (RIGs) or Kernberg’s (1990) affectively invested relationships between self and 
object relations. Bucci (2010) argues that these emotional schemas contain components that are 
sub symbolic and may include imagery, though language may be added to these schemas later. 
“The subsymbolic bodily, sensory, and motoric elements constitute the affective core of the 
schema-the basis on which the schema comes to be organized. The settings of time and place and 
the individuals who figure in our interactions constitute the specific contexts and contents of the 
emotion schemas, which continue to be elaborated throughout life” (p. 1362). Each emotional 
schema has an affective core that contains sub-symbolic bodily, sensory, and motoric elements. 
Schemas can become highly interconnected, with the memory system for anger becoming 
entangled with the schema of control, sex, love, etc. These schemas are memory schemas that 
contain information related to repeated interactions with caregivers over time. However, rather 
than “repressed,” certain painful or traumatic schemas become dissociated, and when they are 
triggered, are likely to not to be recognized or are mislabeled. Bucci (2010) calls the activity of 
linking these non-verbal aspects of these structures to language referential activity, where the 
referential process “links all types of non-verbal representations to one another and to words” 
(Bucci, 2002, p. 767).  
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The referential process can be broken down into three component sub phases for study in 
psychotherapy: arousal, symbolizing, and reorganizing (Bucci and Maskit, 2007). Arousal occurs 
when the affective core of an emotional schema is activated within a session and the dissociated 
sub symbolic bodily elements are activated. The client will try and shield themselves from 
unsymbolized affect from problematic schemas as they have always done through a defensive 
operation like avoidance, somatitization or externalization. Symbolizing occurs when the sub 
symbolic affective elements are linked to images and words. These representations of events in 
the here and now relationship with the therapist interact with fantasies and autobiographical 
material. Within the shared context of the session, these elements are eventually reorganized 
when the material is reflected on along with the here and now material. This potential emotional 
insight leads to a reorganization and change in the problematic schema. Each change can 
potentially lead to deeper levels of sub-symbolic material that can also then be reorganized. This 
process may not happen in a linear order, and some patients may emphasize some elements of 
the process during some parts of the treatment. Bucci and Maskit (2007), in developing their 
methods, believe that each phase of the reflective process contains certain language content and 
style. They have developed a computer assisted way to measure each phase that is constructed 
from function words. 
Bucci can be critiqued from an object relations perspective. Bucci (2002) writes in 
discussing how psychopathology develops, that when a painful emotional schema is triggered 
and the stimulus is not recognized, “the individual will try to provide meaning for the activated 
state, to know ‘why I feel this way.’ The attempt to establish substitute meaning, while avoiding 
knowledge of the actual aroused schema or triggering event, is likely to be destructive in itself, 
appearing in such forms as somatization, displacement, or acting out” (p. 781).  Winnicott (1958) 
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and Bion (1967), for example, would argue that the origin of the individual misrecognizing its 
bodily states comes from the internalized caregiver who misrecognized the needs of the child 
from the beginning. In other words, the “painful emotional schema” doesn’t exist in a vacuum, 
but is rather always a “scene of address,” in the Butler (2004) conception. 
Therapy process research has been criticized for not providing the kind of data 
concerning treatment effectiveness that is needed to support the professional status of the field 
and to validate treatment orientations (Bucci 2007). The process oriented nature of the CCRT, 
FRAMES, and PERT system, for example, have not been established as valid measures of 
outcome. In order to establish transference interpretations as effective mechanisms of change in 
therapy, it is then necessary to turn to outcome research.  
 
Outcome Research of Transference Interpretations  
Though the definitions of transference vary across psychology as well as within 
psychoanalysis, contemporary transference researchers Levy and Scala (2009) defines it as “a 
tendency in which representational aspects of important and formative relationships (such as 
parents and siblings) can be both consciously and/or unconsciously ascribed to other 
relationships” (p. 392). This definition keeps in mind the dynamic unconscious, where these 
processes are related to conflicts and defensive processes in interpersonal relationships between 
self and others.  
 Transference focused psychotherapies using an object relations paradigm have been 
studied (Kernberg, Yeomans, Clarkin, & Levy 2008) and have been developed into an 
empirically focused psychotherapy for borderline personality disorder. In the Transference 
Focused Psychotherapy model, something like the personality in identity diffusion is: 
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based on the idea of a psychological structure composed of multiple split off object relations, 
positive and negative, each of them reflecting a dyadic unit of a self-representation, an object 
representation and a dominant affect linking them. These dyadic units, or dyads, originate in the 
internalization, and subsequent unconscious revision, or affectively intense experiences in the 
course of early development. (p. 603)  
 
One of the benefits of this description of the personality over the others is the stress on 
transference, which is the repetition and recreation of these object relations’ dyads. It is also 
useful as transference interpretations have been empirically validated as a treatment for 
Borderline Personality Disorder (Kernberg, Yeomans, Clarkin, & Levy 2008). They (Clarkin, 
Foelsch, Levy, Hull, Delaney, and Kernberg 2001) found that after a year in treatment, compared 
to baseline, patients’ rate of suicide attempts significantly decreased, that hospitalizations as 
compared to the year beginning treatment was significantly reduced, and those who were 
hospitalized were hospitalized for a significantly shorter time. After the year, 52.9% of the 
patients did not meet criteria for BPD anymore. However, this was an uncontrolled study and 
focused on borderline patients.   
Hoglend (2004) examined the mixed conclusions of previous studies in reviewing 
empirical work on psychodynamic treatment featuring transference. In an early review of 
empirical research looking at previous studies involving the efficacy of transference 
interpretations, Hogeland (2004) found that five out of eight naturalistic studies reported 
negative findings, and two reported non-significant correlations. Only one study reported a 
positive correlation between frequency of transference interpretations and outcome. However, 
Hoglend (2004) argued that these previous studies had faulty designs in that the patients were not 
randomly assigned. He (Hoglend et al., 2008) presented his own work in a large national 
controlled study where patients were randomly assigned to psychodynamic treatment groups 
using different frequencies of transference interpretations. Hogeland and his colleagues 
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(Joahansson at al., 2010) found that those placed in transference-based treatments versus 
psychodynamic treatments that did not stress transference showed an increase of insight in 
interpersonal relationships at a three year follow up. They also found, that while there were 
significant changes both in patients assigned to psychodynamic therapy with and without 
transference interpretations, personality disordered patients in the transference interpretation 
group with poor quality of relationships improved more on measures of interpersonal functioning 
on the Psychodynamic Scales of Functioning (Bogwald and Dahlbender 2004) with increase in 
insight being a key moderator. (Personality disordered patients found to have low Quality of 
Object Relations as measured by Hogeland’s scale, (1993) showed the most improvement in 
interpersonal functioning, in particular.) They also found that patients in the transference group 
were less likely to have received treatment from a mental health professional at a one year follow 
up when compared to the non-transference group (15% versus 55%). Ulberg, Hoglend, Marble 
and Johansson (2012) found in a randomized year long psychodynamic treatment that women 
responded better to a moderate level of transference interpretations when compared to men, 
where women in the moderate rather than no transference interpretation group showed improved 
relational functioning at 1 and 3 year follow ups.  
In sum it seems that transference interpretations work well for patients that have a history 
of interpersonal relationship issues, personality disordered patients, patients with low quality of 
object relations, and better for woman than for men. As a technique, they work substantially 
better with borderline and personality disordered patients. It could be, however, that the 
standardization of transference focused psychotherapy has led to better outcomes as the 
interpretations become structured and adhere to timing in treatment so that most direct 
transference interpretations come in the later third of treatment when the patient has been 
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prepared through other interventions  (Clarkins et. al, 2006). Though more research is needed, 
these outcomes suggest that transference interpretations as a technique may be moderated in 
effectiveness by frequency, accuracy, and patient type. The APS (Waldron et al., 2004a) points 
to quality as another possible moderator of the success of transference interpretations.  
 
Pronoun and Function Word Analysis in Personality Assessment 
 
There is considerable research having used function word analysis in personality 
assessment. Transference, as Butler (2005) points out, works “in order to recreate[s] and 
constitute[s] anew the tacit presumptions about communication and relationality that structure 
the mode of address” (p. 50). The study of function words is one way to measure the analysand’s 
attempt to structure the scene of address, as they have been used to measure various aspects of 
personality. As Weintraub (1986) states, “while it is possible to control what one says to a 
considerable degree, grammatical choices are unconsciously determined” (p. 295) and therefore 
could be a useful avenue through which to tap unconscious processes. Aronson and Weintraub 
(1962, 1964, 1969, 1974) used verbal speech patterns to study the language of psychoanalytic 
defenses by linking personality patterns with grammatical choices. Their method evolved from 
observing the verbal behavior of twenty patients as measured by ten minute “free speech” 
sessions and comparing the language to free speech scripts of a non-clinical control population 
(Weintraub and Aronson, 1962).  They compared the speech patterns of certain language classes 
such as negations (no, not, never), qualifiers, and evaluators. For example, they (1964) found that 
impulsivity, which they linked to the analytic defense of undoing, in inpatient mental patients 
could be measured through frequent use of adversative expressions such as “but,” “however,” 
“nevertheless.” They (1969) found a similar pattern in overeaters, in those who binge eat and 
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then try and undo the consequences of their eating. They also found that obsessive compulsive 
inpatients had a much higher use of explanatory expressions-the use of the defense of 
rationalization- using “because,” “therefore,” and “in order to” as they argued that their 
personalities adhered to an internal need for logic (Weintraub, 1981).  
 Further, Weintraub (1981) found that the infrequent use of “I” indicated an avoidance of 
intimacy; showing movement by the speaker away from intimate topics towards more 
impersonal topics, whereas a high rate of the use of “I” represented a self-preoccupation 
indicative of depression. In looking at egocentrism in children, he found high rates of “I” and 
“me” in children aged 5 and 6, while after 7, the use of “we” increased greatly while “I” and 
“me” decreased. He also found that “we” in moderation can measure an ability to collaborate 
with others, while a high “me” score can represent passivity. Very high and very low Non-
personal references, as in reference to people or objects that are not known to the speaker, 
reflected avoidance of responsibility and preoccupation. Those who used negatives tended to be 
oppositional and made frequent use of the defenses of denial and negation, as they rigidly 
negated themselves and what other people said. They also found that the use of qualifiers like 
“sort of” or “kind of” as well as retractors such as “but” or “however” when used in high 
numbers suggested impulsivity as it showed an ability to undo commitment and that this was 
found in impulsive patients. While Aronson and Weintraub focused on defenses, Steingart and 
Freedman (1972) focused on the structure of the personality organization as revealed through 
object relations.  
Steingart and Freedman (1972) developed a language construction analysis believing that 
“certain types of grammatical diversity…suggest some important, quantifiable dimensions for 
constructs pertaining to representations of self and objects in varying clinical states” (p. 132). 
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They used function words and pronouns to observe the degree of differentiation in self-other 
representations, the balance between narcissistic and libidinal attachment to objects, and the 
division of selective attention between interactional and solitary features of the representational 
world by looking at inpatient clinical interviews. They coded language according to fragmented 
language (grammatically incoherent language), narrative language, and complex language. In 
order to do this, they removed all punctuation and determined sentence units by finding where 
one grammatically well-formed sentence ended and another could begin. A simple sentence then 
only contained a single independent clause, while a complex sentence contained a subordinate 
clause. They also included two sub headings for simple sentences of either specified simple 
narrative language or extended simple narrative language. The researchers further coded 
contiguous language (or conditional language) which included any two sentences that are 
connected and where the second sentence refers to the first. They also broke the coding down 
into self/object, where the object could be inanimate or not, and also coded for whether the 
language focused on monadic relationships or dyadic relationships. According to this 
methodology, they found that depending on the level of pathology in the patient, the complexity 
of their language declined with the level of their pathology, where a schizophrenic patient 
exhibited the most fragmented speech with the least amount of complex contiguous language. 
Steingart and Freedman also noted that a bipolar patient would produce more narrative language 
and much less conditional complex when depressed. However, this methodology was not applied 
to therapy process research.  
Spence, Mayes, and Dahl (1994) used a systematic analysis of pronouns, specifically 
you/me clusters to look at the “analytic surface” and as a way to plan interpretations when both 
the analyst and analysand had entered the “analytic space.” They used the co-occurrence rate of 
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“you” and “me” as a potential measure for transference intensity, hypothesizing that “A single 
“you” followed many sentences later by a single “me” (high separation) is telling a very different 
story from “you” almost followed immediately by “me” (low separation)” (p. 47). They further 
hypothesized but did not test that a high co-occurrence rate of personal pronouns like “I/me” or 
“me/mine” would mean the client had not entered the shared analytic space, and that this would 
be a time when the client was absorbed by their inner world. They found that the highest level of 
co-occurrence of “you/me” pairings happened during what the author’s judged to be an intense 
transference fantasy in the analysis of Mrs. C. Further, during these moments of high co-
occurrence of you and me in the patient’s speech, Spence (1995) found that the analyst’s 
interpretations were more comprehensive and probing, that he intervened earlier and more often, 
and that these interventions resulted in a greater frequency of the patient’s associations. Low 
scoring hours, on the other hand, resulted in a decrease of the patient’s production of 
associations, fewer interventions, and greater misunderstanding between the analyst and patient.  
 Van Staden and Fulford (2004), looking at changes in linguistic markers in the course of 
psychotherapy, were clear in what changes they saw in pronoun usage in mental health 
improvements.  The authors used Frege’s “logic of relations” to define the meaning of first 
person pronouns as variables distinct from grammatical usage variables. They derived this 
meaning by looking at first person pronouns occupied an “alpha” or “omega position. The 
author’s argue that the alpha position is the agent of the sentence while the omega position is 
accidental to the sentence. For example, in “I hit the dog” and the “dog was hit by me,” the first 
person pronoun still inhabits the alpha position while the dog occupies the omega position, 
where as in both “I was bitten by the dog,” and the “dog bit me,” the positions switch. The 
authors argued that the alpha position has more to do with agency and that increases of alpha 
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positions in semantic analysis would correlate with other methods of improved mental health 
outcomes. The authors looked at shifts in semantic usage of pronouns in looking at a collection 
of psychotherapy transcripts. The authors examined the top ten most productive and bottom ten 
least productive psychotherapies and found that increases in alpha position and decreases in 
omega position occurred in the improvement cases while decreases in alpha and increases in 
omega positon happened in the worsening cases.  
Bucci and Maskit (2007) have developed various dictionary systems to measure 
reflective activity, and have used this computerized language analysis software to measure 
referential activity across therapy. Like Weintraub (1986), they argue that function word usage is 
largely unconscious. They developed a computerized dictionary system to measure Reflective 
Activity, the Weighted Referential Activity Dictionary, or WRAD. The dictionary highly 
correlates with clinical judgment of RA scored from RA scales including specificity (quantity of 
detail), imagery, (degree to which language evokes imagery), clarity (organization and focus), 
and concreteness, (degree of reference to sensory and other body experiences). It is primarily 
composed of function and auxiliary words most associated with this type of material. They also 
developed dictionaries for Affect, Reflection, and Disfluency. The Affect dictionary contains 
words such as “sad,” or “angry,” and are coded by negative, positive or neutral valence. They 
also created a Reflective dictionary, containing words referring to cognitive or logical functions 
like “if” “and” “but” and “think” and “believe.” They also created a Disfluency dictionary, 
created from words like “ummm,” “ah,” and “etc.” In looking at of sixteen sessions, the WRAD 
positively correlated (.538, p<.05) with clinical ratings of reflective functioning within sessions, 
positively correlated with the Affect dictionary (.457, p. <.10), and negatively correlated with 
Disfluency (-.421, p<.10).  
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Thinking of Pennebaker’s (2003) changes in flexibility in terms of function word use as 
predicting better health outcomes, Weintraub’s (1981) look at defensive formation would suggest 
that an overuse of certain words indicates a certain type of defensive structure, and that the 
continuation of that structure would be indicative of unchanging defensive operations, i.e., lack 
of therapeutic change. If change were shown, it could be argued that the person was less 
defensive. Thinking in terms of Steingart and Freedman’s (1972) study, in order to make a more 
complex sentence indicating a higher level of object relations, more and different function words 
would need to be used in order to connect the clauses, indicating that function words would be a 
useful measure. Dahl’s (1994) study would suggest that function word use, especially pronouns, 
would be a way to measure the attentional focus of the patient, where “you” and “me” would 
indicate the patient’s focus has turned outwards, and that “I/me/mine” clusters showed 
attentional focus on the self. Echoing Lacan (1953), Van Staden and Fulford (2004) showed how 
pronoun use can show the ego’s orientation to reality and that successful therapy can help the 
patient become more agentive. Bucci’s (2007) development of the WRAD dictionary illustrated 
that a dictionary system comprised of function words is an elegant way to linguistically measure 
certain therapeutic states.  
 
Pennebaker and Non-Clinical Literature Review 
To outline their process, Pennebaker et al. (2010), as mentioned earlier, follows certain 
linguistic precedents in splitting language into two distinct classes of words. Content words are 
the first class of words and include nouns, adjectives, most adverbs, and regular verbs. This class 
of words carries the content and meaning of a sentence in lexical communication. Content words 
contrast with function words, or what Pennebaker and Tausczik (2010) call “style words.” 
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Function words are made up of articles, prepositions, conjunctions, auxiliary verbs, and 
pronouns. In linguistic terms, this is a split between semantics and syntax. Pennebaker and 
Tauszik argue that style words reflect “how people are communicating whereas content words 
convey what they are saying” (p. 29). In measuring the “how” and the “what” of verbal 
communication, Pennebaker has found that style words are closely linked to measures of 
people’s social and psychological worlds. This is based partly on the expectation that the speaker 
and listener will share the same knowledge of style words, as they lack the specificity of content 
words (Chung and Pennebaker, 2007). For example, for a particle such as “here” to make sense, 
both listener and speaker must know where “here” is referring to. Below is a summary of the 
different ways function and content words have been used to measure different psychological 
and social issues that will inform parts of my proposed study, as outlined by Tausczik and 
Pennebaker (2010).  
 
Attentional Focus 
Pennebaker (2010) and others have found that function words, such as personal pronouns, 
can be used to look at attentional focus. People who are in emotional pain tend to have attention 
drawn to themselves and subsequently use more first person singular pronouns (Rude, Gortner, 
& Pennebaker, 2004). It has also been found that people who sit in front of a mirror and 
complete a questionnaire tend to use more “I” and “me” than when the mirror is not present 
(Davis and Brock, 1975). Given the theorized role between the mother as mirror as described by 
Winnicott (1967),  it is not surprising to find that people who scored higher on a narcissism scale 
used more first person singular pronouns and fewer first person plural pronouns on a monologue 
task, with no change in third person pronouns (Raskin and Shaw, 1988). This follows also from a 
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study of depression where depressed participants used more negatively valenced content words 
and used the word “I” more than never depressed participants, which follows Pycsinski and 
Greenberg’s (1987) self-focus model of depression.  This self-focus in the use of “I” also follows 
a finding by Stirman and Pennebaker (2001) that looked at suicidal versus non-suicidal poets. 
Suicidal poets were found to use far more first person singular (I, me, my) words, and fewer 
words referring to a social collective (we, us, our) when compared to matched non-suicidal 
poets. This is despite there being no difference between the poets’ use of negative or positive 
emotional words. Higher use of first person nouns are further associated with lower status, where 
higher status individuals use more first person plural pronouns and refer to other people more 
(Pennebaker and Tausczik, 2010).  
In non-therapeutic studies that may have implications for looking at pronoun change and 
attentional focus, (Gunsch, Brownlow, Haynes & Mabe, 2000) found that more self-reference (I 
and me) was present in positive ad campaigns while more “other” references (he and she) were 
present in negative ads. Similarly, in looking at differences between pronouns usage in teasing, 
Kowlaski (2000) found that the attention always fell on the victim of the teasing. In the study, 
where participants wrote one narrative about being teased and one narrative about teasing 
someone else, they found that in the teasing narrative, more other focused words (e.g. he, she, 
they) was used while in the being teased group, participants made more reference to themselves 
(more first person singular reference). This fits well with my thesis in the idea of looking at the 
self as subject and the self as object of others in the matrix of transference.  
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Improving Mental Health Outcomes 
In text analyses of improving mental health outcomes, many studies have looked at 
changing pronoun use. Dunnack and Park (2009) found that use of the pronoun “I” was initially 
related to poor adjustment as measured in college students writing about loss. However, the use 
of “I” by the final journal entry was linked to several aspects of better psychological adjustment. 
Pennebaker and Greybeal (2001) found that journaling was associated for certain mental health 
outcomes in certain writing styles. Those that used the writing to “vent” in an idea of catharsis 
were found to not improve in mental health outcomes. However, those that showed an overall 
increase in causal words (e.g. “because”, “cause,” “reason”) and insight words (“realized,” 
“know,” understand”) showed comparatively larger and more significant health improvements 
then those who did not increase their use of causal words. In another study (Campbell and 
Pennebaker, 2003), the authors found that changes in function words were correlated with better 
health outcomes. 
The tense of verbs can also be used to look at temporal focus. In the study of political 
ads, the authors found that there was much more focus on the future in positive ads in the use of 
present and future tense while negative ads had more past tense verbs. The authors infer that this 
is because the positive ads focused on the present and future acts of the candidate while the 
negative ads focused on past actions of the opponent (Gunsch et al., 2000). In looking at the 
resolution of a past event, Pasupathi (2007) found that participants used greater past tense in 
discussing a disclosed event and greater present tense in discussing an undisclosed event. Verb 
tense differences could indicate increased psychological distance and a higher degree of 
resolution for disclosed events compared with undisclosed events. “Pronouns and verb tense are 
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useful linguistic elements that can help identify focus, which in turn can show priorities, 
intentions, and processing” (p. 31).  
 
Thinking styles: Conjunctions, Nouns, Verbs, and Cognitive mechanisms  
Pennebaker (2010) argues that the depth of thinking can also be measured by language, 
and points to language changing when people are actively reevaluating a past event. This seems 
particularly interesting to my proposed research given the reappraisal of past events that occur in 
the context of psychoanalysis. Pennebaker argues that the LIWC system can capture two aspects 
of complex thinking through exclusion words and conjunctions. Exclusion words like “but,” 
“without,” and “exclude” help in making categories and therefore act as a way to differentiate 
between multiple competing ideas. Conjunctions “like,” “and,” “also,” and “although” join 
words together and allow for someone to integrate language into a coherent idea. In terms of 
complexity, they can be used as a measure of integration of one’s speech or narrative and as a 
measure of differentiation. High numbers of prepositions and cognitive words such as “know,” 
“cause,” “ought,” and “realize” can also be used as a measure of more complex language.  
In a reanalysis of expressive writing samples, Pennebaker, Mayne, and Francis (1997) 
found that increasing use of causal words and insight words lead to greater health improvements. 
The greater use of causal words such as “because,” “hence,” or “effect” and insight words like 
“think,” “know,” and “consider” suggest the active reappraisal of past events. Furthermore, 
certain language can be used to measure the extent to which a given story has been established or 
is still being formed. Insecurity can be measured in the use of tentative words like maybe, 
perhaps, or guess and more filler words like ummm, blah, you know, I mean. When stories are 
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more formed, people tend to use less filler words then those who have are disclosing a story for 
the first time (Pasupathi, 2007).  
 
Summary and Hypothesis 
The review of the literature suggested several exploratory hypotheses. To summarize: 
Weintraub (1981) found that certain defenses manifest in the dependable use of particular 
function words. Further, in his scoring manual Weintraub (1981) found that the infrequent use of 
“I” indicated an avoidance of intimacy; showing movement by the speaker away from more 
personal topics towards more impersonal topics, whereas a high rate represented self-
preoccupation that can be indicative of depression. In looking at egocentrism in children, he 
found high rates of “I” and “me” in children aged 5 and 6 while after 7, the use of “we” 
increased greatly while “I” and “me” decreased. He also found that “we” in moderation can 
measure an ability to collaborate with others. Stirman and Pennebaker (2001) also found that “I” 
was significantly associated with poet’s that had completed suicide, while Choudhury et. Al 
(2013) in a non-academic study of social media found that high use of “I” was associated with 
post-partum depression in new mothers. Main (Main, 2000) found in using the AAI that the 
predictability of inflexible attention could be seen in language and used as a way to measure 
attachment style. This inflexibility in language links to the inflexibility in the attachment style, 
which seems to suggest and support Fonagy’s and Target (2000) notion that rigidity of self/other 
relations is one way to define psychopathology.  
Further, Weintraub (1986), and Freedman’s (1972) findings suggest that one way to 
measure that inflexibility or rigidity is through linguistic patterns that reflect either structural or 
defensive operations. Pennebaker and Campbell’s (2003) findings that flexibility rather than 
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inflexibility in function word use is indicative of health would then be another way to measure 
this phenomena. However, adding the analytic literature, suggests that an inflexibility in function 
word use reflects an inflexibility in object relating, that the patient is attempting to recreate the 
“scene of address” (Butler, 2005) into a “new edition” (Freud, 2017) of a past relationship. 
Studies (e.g. Van Staden and Fulford, 2004) show that changes in pronoun usage can show 
therapeutic improvement or lack thereof. Due to the uniqueness of the analytic “scene of 
address” (Butler, 2005), and Pennebaker and Campbell’s (2003) findings, several exploratory 
hypotheses can be generated.  
If we believe that transference interpretations are mutative for the patient, than we can 
assume that transference interpretations will result in a measurable change in the flexibility of the 
of the patient’s function word use. This presupposes that the patient’s verbal behavior will show 
inflexible patterns of function word use that will become more flexible over the course of the 
analysis. Hypothesis one is that there will be a measurable change in the flexibility of the 
patient’s verbal behavior as measured by function words during the course of the analysis.  
The second hypothesis is that there will be a measurable change in self reference as 
measured by pronouns over the course of the analysis. The null hypothesis is that there will be no 
measurable change in self reference. Given Campbell and Pennebaker’s (2001) findings 
concerning change in self reference and the use of “I” especially, and my own hypothesized link 
between “I” and transference, “I” will be looked at as the primary measure of change. 
Hypothesis two is that there will be a measurable change in pronoun use over the course of the 
analysis. 
Finally, assuming there is a change in pronoun use hypothetically related to transference, 
the third hypothesis is that there should be other changes in language that can also be measured 
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that would reflect on different linguistic self/other states due to hypothesized therapeutic 
changes. The third hypothesis is that there will be other observable language changes that are 
related to the hypothesized pronoun changes. 
A further qualitative analysis will be undertaken to investigate if there is a relationship 
between this assumed change in function word use and transference. As there is no external 
measure of transference available, this part of the analysis will take place in the form of a 
qualitative textual analysis looking in depth at selected sessions. The exploratory hypothesis is 
that there is a relationship between transference and any measurable change in function word 
use. 
Freud (1916, 1917), believed resolving transference to be one necessary goal of an 
analytic process. The work of several authors’ (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1988; Gill& 
Hoffman, 1982; Teller & Dahl, 1986; Waldron et al., 2004) indicates that measuring transference 
maybe be possible through changes in language use by the patient. To date there appears to be 
little or no research on the relationship between transference and its relationship to the use of 
pronouns to describe the self. This is especially important given the idea that the self is 
composed of the self in relationship to others, built on the decay of past object relations (Freud, 
1923). Therefore my primary hypothesis is that there is a relationship between the reliable use of 
certain function words and the state of the transference with the analyst.  
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Chapter 2. Methods 
Data 
The data for this experiment are comprised of the transcripts of the psychoanalysis of 
“A2;” a young agoraphobic housewife who had physical symptoms of vomiting and diarrhea. 
The analysis took place in a large Midwestern town during the 1970s.  Her symptoms improved 
considerably in a more than 300 hour, four times a week analysis, which became a twice weekly 
treatment as termination approached. This patient has been used in psychoanalytic outcome 
research performed using the Analytic Process Scale (Waldron, Scharf, Hurst, Firestein, & 
Burton, 2004, 2004). These data were selected for the high number of transference 
interpretations. Given my interest in pronouns, the data was edited according to the LIWC 2007 
protocol so that statements such as “you know” were counted in the non-fluency category rather 
than as a pronoun.  
Measures 
Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis (2007) developed the Language Inquiry and Word Count 
(LIWC) system to analyze text and to break it down into different categories based on linguistic 
categories. The program is split into the processing system which does the actual text analysis 
and the dictionary system. The processing system goes through every word of a text that is 
loaded into the program and is then compared to a dictionary file. A dictionary file is defined as 
the “collection of words that define a particular category” (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) and 
the investigator can create a unique dictionary or dictionaries in order to study their chosen 
phenomena. The system also has preprogrammed dictionary files for cognitive words, verb tense, 
and function word analysis. Objective dictionaries, such as verbs, were created by simply 
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creating an LIWC dictionary for verbs and adding all verbs to it. For more subjective words, like 
the LIWC category for “Cognitive Words,” two out of three judges voted to include or to 
exclude the word of a given category (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). The system then 
calculates a percentage match of a given text to the dictionaries provided, allowing the researcher 
to analyze up to 82 unique variables within a text. The default LIWC 2007 software is comprised 
of 2,290 words and word stems. The word “cried,” for example, would match five different 
LIWC categories including verbs, past tense, sadness, affect, and negative emotion (Pennebaker, 
Boyd, Jordan, and Blackburn, 2015).  In clinical research, the LIWC has been used in therapeutic 
process research to study aspects of integration and disintegration in patient speech (Gilhooley, 
2005). While all preexisting LIWC dictionaries will be used to examine aspects of the 
hypothesized changes, function words, pronouns, and the LIWC category for “I” will be 
examined most closely. This category is comprised of words such as “I, me, and my.”  
Design 
As change in psychotherapy is often non-linear (Hayes, Laurenceau, Feldma, Strauss, and 
Cardaciotto, 2007), graphs will be used to show fluctuations of change across the course of the 
analysis. Hypothesis one is that there will be a measurable change in the flexibility of the 
patient’s verbal behavior as measured by function words during the course of the analysis 
The analysis will be segmented into three sections representing the beginning, middle, 
and late stages of the analysis. Similarity of the means of function word use from individual 
sessions will be compared to each other session in the phase of treatment creating a similarity 
coefficient based on the degree of correlation from consecutive session segment to consecutive 
session segment. Flexibility will be operationally defined as statistically significant differences in 
mean function word use, where the beginning sessions are expected to be the most highly 
44 
 
correlated. That is to say, there should be more variability as measured by a lessening correlation 
coefficient as the treatment progresses. It is expected that there will be far more variability 
(dissimilarity in correlation coefficient) in function word use in section three than section one. 
The least amount of change is expected in phase one, with each mean being similar to the other, 
and the greatest amount of change is expected in phase three, where the means will be most 
dissimilar. The first third of the analysis will show less variability in function word use than the 
middle phase and that the third will show the most overall. 
Function words will be operationalized as the LIWC category for function words. As 
there are 48 sessions available, the beginning, middle, and late phase of the analysis will each 
contain sixteen sessions. Segments less than 450 words will not be included in the correlations.  
Each phase (beginning, middle, and end) of treatment will be divided into 16 sessions then 
further divided into sequences of 8 consecutive sessions. This will come to six segments total, 
each consisting of 8 sessions.   
Each eight-session segment will then be divided in half so that comparisons within 
consecutive sessions could be included. In order to increase the number of comparisons, the data 
will be broken down further into five hundred word segments. The rationale for this is that 
correlation within segments should higher than correlations with other segments, given the 
distance between certain consecutive sessions. For example, for phase one of the treatment, 
segment 1, part 1 contains sessions 1-4, segment 1 part 2 contains sessions 5-8, while segment 2, 
part 1 contains sessions  26-29, segment 2 part 2 contains 30-33. For phase 2 of the treatment, 
segment 3 part1 contains sessions 140-143, segment 3 part 2 contains sessions 144-147, segment 
4 part 1 contains sessions 265-268, segment 4 part 2 contains sessions 269-272. For Phase 3 of 
the treatment, segment 5 part 1 contains sessions 305-308 and segment 5 part 2 contains sessions 
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309-312, while segment 6 part1 contains 317-320 and segment 6 part 2 contains sessions 321-
324. See table 1. 
Table 1.  
Segmentation of Sessions 
Beginning (16 Sessions) Middle (16 Sessions) End (16 Sessions) 
Segment 1 part 1 
Sessions 1-4 
Segment 3 part 1 
Sessions 140-143 
Segment 5 part 1 
Sessions 305-308 
Segment 1 part 2 
Sessions 5-8 
Segment 3 part 2 
Sessions 144-147 
Segment 5 part 2 
Sessions 309-312 
Segment 2 part 2 
Sessions 26-29 
Segment 4 part 1 
Sessions 265-268 
Segment 6 part 1 
Sessions 317-320 
Segment 2 part 3 
Sessions 30-33 
Segment 4 part 2 
Sessions 269-272 
Session 6 part 2 
Sessions 321-324 
 
Each segment will then be correlated to each other segment within a given phase of 
treatment (beginning to beginning, middle to middle, end to end) giving six correlations total for 
each phase of treatment using a Spearman’s rank order, as the data is non-normal. The 
correlation coefficients from each phase of treatment (Beginning, middle, and end) will then be 
added together and divided by the number of comparisons in order to get the mean correlation 
coefficient for each phase of treatment. It is hypothesized that phase one will be the closest to a 
mean correlation coefficient of one for both the use of “I” and for the overall category of 
function words using the LIWC system.  
The second exploratory hypothesis is that there will be a measurable change in pronoun 
use over the course of the analysis. A preliminary look at the available session sequences made it 
clear that the data points do not support a three-section break down as there is no true middle 
section. The forty eight sessions available come in 8 consecutive session blocks such that the 
first eight sessions are the first eight sessions of the analysis, while the next eight sessions are 
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actually the 26th sessions through the 33rd, and the next eight session block is session 140 to 
session 147. There are nearly 118 sessions missing in the middle, with the next eight session 
segment starting at session 265-272, with the remaining sixteen sessions occurring after this 
session. Given the gap in the distribution in the middle sessions versus the comparably smaller 
gaps in the beginning cluster of sessions and the ending cluster of sessions discovered in the 
preliminary analysis, the distribution and nature of the data as an N=1 case suggested a more 
statistically descriptive approach to the data which informed the following hypotheses. 
Given the distribution of available sessions, it made sense to break the analysis first and 
second half of the analysis.  As change in psychotherapy is often non-linear (Hayes, Laurenceau, 
Feldma, Strauss, and Cardaciotto, 2007), graphs will be used to depict fluctuations of change 
across the course of the analysis. As the data is non-parametric, descriptive statistics and Z-
scores will also be used to show change.  Though all function words will be analyzed, pronouns 
will be predicted to show the most amount of change due to their hypothesized links to self/other 
relationships, and the way they are hypothesized to change given a treatment focusing on 
transference. 
The third exploratory hypothesis is that there will be specific observable LIWC language 
categories will be related to hypothesized pronoun changes. Changes in pronouns should 
correlate with other language category changes as the focus shifts from the self (I) to others in 
what is described as more “dominant” (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) speech patterns and as 
the transference is explored and resolved. These hypothesized relationships between self-states 
and transference should be manifest in verbal behavior. Relationships between pronouns and 
other language categories will be explored examining Z Scores, as the data is non-parametric and 
only descriptive statistics are available for analysis.  
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A separate section will examine whether a relationship between transference and the 
measurable change in function word use can be seen. A qualitative examination of the text will 
be carried out based on the findings of the first hypothesis, focusing on hypothesized changes in 
pronoun use and other verbal categories as measured by the existing LIWC dictionaries. Data 
from the previous hypotheses will be used to guide a qualitative examination of specific session 
transcripts in order to establish a relationship between hypothetical changes in self-reference. 
Given Campbell and Pennebaker’s (2001) findings concerning pronouns, three outlying sessions 
exhibiting the hypothesized pronoun change will be selected from the first half and second half 
of the analysis.  As there is no external measure of transference available for this data, a 
qualitative analysis will undertake to understand the relationship between proposed findings in 
changes in function word use and its possible relationship to transference. The analyst’s 
interventions will then be examined to see if there is a relationship between pronoun usage and 
analyst intervention to see if there is a relationship between pronouns, functions words, and 
transference. A transference interpretation will be operationalized according to Levy and Scala’s 
(2012) definition, where a: “transference interpretation is a tactful comment that clarifies and 
links the patient's experience of others outside of therapy with that of the therapist in therapy and 
to the patient's experience of past relationships with caregivers” (Author’s Italics, p. 394). 
Where, “Transference interpretations focus on connecting the patient's feelings and behaviors 
that are occurring in the here-and-now of the therapy with regard to the therapist with the 
patient's preconceived representational models of significant others” (Levy and Scala, 2012, p. 
394).  
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Chapter 3. Results 
It was hypothesized that when comparing the mean correlations of function words as an 
overall category as measured by the LIWC system and the LIWC category for “I” specifically, 
that of the beginning, middle and end phases, the beginning phase would show the highest 
correlation mean score representing the least flexible language use and that the end phase would 
show the lowest mean correlation score meaning the most flexible language use.  
After segmentation into 500 word segments, and the elimination of points containing less 
than 450 words, there were 523 points of data. (Table 2 below outlines how the beginning, 
middle, and end phases of the treatment were organized.) The beginning phase comprised 196 
data points, the middle phase was comprised of 172 data points, and the end phase comprised 
155 points of data. The beginning phase, middle, and end phases were then broken down into 4 
comparable section for correlations. In the beginning phase, there were four groups of 49 data 
points each, in the middle phase, there were four groups of 43 points each, and in the end phase, 
there were three groups of 39 and one group of 38.  Each Phase segments was correlated to each 
other phase segment using a Spearman’s rank order, as the data has a non-normal distribution. 
The correlation coefficients from each phase were then added together and divided by the 
number of comparisons in order to get the mean correlation coefficient. See tables 3-5 in the 
appendix for the results for correlations using the LIWC function words category. See tables 6-9 
for the LIWC “I” category also in the appendix.  
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Table 2. 
 Beginning, Middle, and End Phase Segmentation by Session Number 
Beginning (16 Sessions) 
196 total data points of 500 
words each 
Middle (16 Sessions) 
172 total data points of 500 
words each 
End (16 Sessions) 
155 data points of 500 words 
each 
Segment 1 part 1  
(func11, “I” 11) 
 
Segment 3 part 1  
(func 31, “I” 31) 
 
 
Segment 5 part 1  
(func51, “I”51) 
 
 
Segment 1 part 2  
(func12, “I” 12) 
 
Segment 3 part 2  
(func32, “I” 32) 
 
Segment 5 part 2  
(func52, “I”52) 
 
Segment 2 part 1  
(func21, “I” 21) 
 
 
Segment 4 part 1  
(func41, “I” 41) 
 
 
Segment 6 part 1  
(func61, “I”61) 
 
 
Segment 2 part 2  
(func22, “I” 23) 
 
 
Segment 4 part 2  
(func42, “I” 42) 
 
 
Session 6 part 2  
(func62, “I”62) 
 
 
 
My hypothesis was that there should be more variability as measured by a lessening 
correlation coefficient as the treatment progresses. It was expected that there would be far more 
variability (dissimilarity in correlation coefficient or a correlation coefficient furthest from one, 
positive one being an exact match) in function word use in section three than section one. The 
mean correlation coefficient for the use of function words for the beginning phase was R=-
0.1145 (table 4, appendix), for the middle phase R=-0.0818 (table 5, appendix), and for the end 
phase R=-0.0382 (table 6, appendix). For the LIWC category for “I”, the mean correlation 
coefficient for the beginning phase was R=0.1308 (table 7, appendix), for the middle phase R=-
0.0138 (table 8, appendix), and for the end phase R=0.1733 (table 9, appendix).  The results did 
not confirm the initial hypothesis, as for both the Function word category and “I” category, the 
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most similar sessions are in the end section. For function words, the beginning phase is the least 
similar from session to session, followed by the middle phase, and then the third phase. For the 
LIWC category of “I,” the most similar sessions are towards the end, then the beginning phase, 
followed by the middle phase. In attempting to look at variance as a measure of inflexibility, 
there were the same findings as “I” in that the middle phase had the most variance, followed by 
the beginning, then end phase. Given that the most dissimilarity for “I” is found in the middle 
section, this indicates that the dissimilarity is most likely due to the 118 session gap in the data 
analyzed. Furthermore, of the two 8 session parts that make up the middle, the first eight session 
is closer in distance as measured by session (107 sessions between the beginning section ending 
at session 33) to beginning of the data, and the second 8 session part might be more like the end 
part of that data (given there is only a 34 session gap between the last eight sessions of the 
middle and the beginning 8 sessions of the end segment). Given the findings that there is a 
missing middle in the available data, separating the data into two parts rather than three became 
the logical next step. (This difference becomes quite clear when examining graph 2.) 
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Figure 1. Mean “I” use for first half and second half of the analysis 
 
 
One of the findings generated from the first hypothesis is that there is no true middle section to 
the analysis, as the available data does not provide a proper middle section. If we split the 
sessions in half instead of in thirds, we find that out of the first 24 sessions, 16 sessions are above 
the mean for the LIWC category for “I”, while for the second half, 6 sessions are higher than the 
overall mean.  In other words, in the first half of treatment, 67% of the sessions are above the 
mean for use of “I” per session. For the second half of treatment, only 25% are above the mean 
for the use of “I” per session. This represents a 42% change from the first half of the treatment to 
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the second half of the treatment. The changes are clearer if we look at the changes relative to the 
entire data set as represented by the second graph, which shows the mean LIWC category for “I” 
over all time points in the analysis, with a clear change in the middle of the treatment.  
 
Figure 2. Mean “I” usage across the complete analysis 
 
 
The above graph (Graph 2) shows a preponderance of “I” usage in the first half of the 
analysis, and then a steady but notable decline in usage towards the end of the analysis with an 
uptick towards the end. In order to further investigate the graph data, quantitative and qualitative 
analysis will be undertaken by examining the content of outlying High I sessions for patterns that 
characterize the sessions. Keeping in mind the original idea that language use in terms of self-
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reference is related to the state of the transference, outlying Low I sessions will also be studied 
then compared to the High I sessions to see if there is a relationship between therapeutic action 
and the findings of decreasing LIWC “I” usage throughout the analysis. Z scores tabulated from 
the overall mean of the entire data set will be used.  
 
Hypothesis 3 
  In examining outlying High I sessions from Graph 1, the three sessions with the Highest 
“I” score in the first half of the analysis and three sessions from the second half of the analysis 
will be selected. Other function words and LIWC language Categories that are unusually high (Z 
score above one) or unusually low (Z score below one) will be identified. This procedure will be 
repeated for the Low I sessions. The highest three “I” sessions from the first half of the analysis 
are sessions 31 with a mean of 11.25 (Z score= 2.03), 145 with a mean of 11.34 (Z Score=2.09), 
and session 146 with a mean of 11.31 (Z score=2.09) The mean for the LIWC I category for the 
first half of the analysis is 9.10 and the overall mean is 8.43. 
In the second half of the analysis, the three highest I scores are for sessions 308 with a 
mean of 9.57 (Z score=0.82), 321 with a mean of 10.07 (Z score=1.17) and 324 with a mean of 
9.64 (Z score=0.87). The mean I use for the second half of the analysis is 7.76 and the overall 
mean is 8.43.  
If we examine the Z scores, what we find are that High I session tend to have high affect, 
especially negative affect such as sadness, anxiety, or anger (31, 145, 146, 308, 321, 324), high 
you scores (31, 145, 308), low we scores (31, 145, 308, 321), high present tense scores (31, 146, 
308, 321), low conjunction scores (31,146, 321, 324), low preposition scores, and high verb 
scores (146, 308, 321). See the following table for Z scores that were above or below one in at 
least two sessions. 
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Table 3.  
High “I” z scores for selected LIWC categories 
Session number 31 145 146 308 321 324
Z I 2.02796 2.09267 2.0711 0.8199 1.17225 0.87024
Z you 1.98273 0.80554 0.03584 1.43941 -1.91104 0.37542
Z we -1.10219 -0.87102 0.44996 -0.47472 -1.46546 -0.7059
Z heshe -1.51348 -0.61704 1.36407 -1.70173 -0.9308 -0.81426
Z they -0.67069 -0.61617 -1.8701 -1.51573 1.59183 -0.94328
Z negation 0.55928 0.41724 3.17684 1.28976 0.90423 -0.45528
Z verbs 0.57679 0.10057 2.74313 1.82804 2.01479 0.63282
Z affect 1.86816 2.376 -0.2503 0.7654 0.60579 -0.16324
Z posemo -0.73961 1.6088 -1.45894 1.82037 -0.65498 0.80484
Z negemo 1.56773 0.56908 0.27536 -0.40019 1.77333 -0.69391
Z anx 1.89172 0.60829 -2.06552 -0.88904 3.54948 0.44786
Z anger -0.47264 0.30608 1.75971 0.46183 -1.14754 -1.40712
Z sad 1.85974 -0.52073 2.45486 -0.58685 0.60338 1.33075
Z conj -0.72945 0.10107 -2.60141 -0.84809 -0.63717 -0.99311
Z preps -1.70792 -1.40853 -0.32813 -1.83808 -0.04176 -0.3021
Z present 1.66526 -0.26819 2.08531 1.81969 0.66456 -0.02728
Z past -1.64351 0.29756 -0.16288 -1.41781 -0.14483 -0.67749
Z future -0.7305 0.52427 -0.24253 0.00145 2.40643 3.10352  
 
Low I Text 
For the first half of the sessions the three sessions that have the least LIWC I category use 
are session 1 with a mean score of 6.90 (Z score=-1.10), session 4 with a score of 7.38 (Z score=-
0.75), and session 33 with a score of 7.67 (Z score=-0.55).  
For the second half of the analysis, the lowest “I” sessions are 271 with a use of 5.77 (Z 
score=-1.91), 307 with 5.85 (Z score=-1.86), and session 317 with 5.88 (Z score=-1.83). The 
mean for the second half is lower than the first at 7.76 while the overall mean remains 8.43. See 
the following table for a list of Z scores. Categories were selected based on High I categories 
with two or more sessions above or below a Z score of one.  
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Table 4.  
Low “I” z scores for selected LIWC categories 
Session number 1 4 33 271 307 317
Z I -1.10004 -0.75488 -0.54635 -1.9126 -1.85508 -1.8335
Z you -1.09606 0.05848 -0.89232 0.01321 -0.73385 -1.36772
Z we 1.17649 -0.47472 1.07742 3.25703 0.68113 2.03513
Z heshe -0.24951 0.3511 1.03239 -0.07918 1.57922 -0.76944
Z they -0.83425 0.63775 -0.64343 1.10116 1.15568 3.20012
Z negation -0.15092 -1.22635 -0.09004 0.39695 -1.95683 -0.77994
Z verbs -0.57174 -0.22624 -0.68379 0.24998 -1.62689 -1.80431
Z affect 0.27206 -1.58521 1.24423 1.02658 -0.16324 -1.44011
Z posemo 0.93178 -1.58588 -0.82423 1.69343 0.12782 -1.58588
Z negemo 0.33411 -0.40019 1.09778 0.09913 -0.45894 -0.16522
Z anx 0.87567 -0.88904 -0.24733 -0.24733 0.23396 1.67782
Z anger -1.30329 -0.88797 0.15034 -0.42073 -0.57648 -0.47264
Z sad 0.73563 0.40501 1.92586 0.07439 -0.25623 -1.18197
Z conj -0.62399 -0.37351 1.10296 0.76021 1.97303 0.50974
Z preps -0.3021 -0.84881 -0.224 -0.10685 -0.36718 0.71321
Z present -0.20024 -0.157 -0.19407 0.09008 -1.67041 -1.49127
Z past -0.24414 0.27047 -0.16288 0.14408 1.38997 0.758
Z future 0.31514 -0.83506 0.21058 -0.45166 -1.1139 0.14087  
 
Low I sessions were not as dramatic in terms of observable changes as the High I sessions. Some 
trends observed were that Low I sessions were characterized by low “you” scores (sessions 1, 
317), high “we” scores (sessions 1, 33, 271, 317), high “he/she” scores (sessions 33, 307), high 
“they” scores (sessions 271, 307, 317), low negation (sessions 4, 307), low verbs (sessions 307, 
317), mixed affect (high scores in sessions 33, 271, low scores in sessions 4, 317), mixed 
positive emotion (high scores in session 271, low scores in sessions 4, 317), one session high for 
negative emotion (33), one session high for anxiety (317), one session low for anger (1), one 
session high and one session low for sadness (high 33, low 317),  high conjugations (sessions 33, 
307), low present tense (sessions 307, 317), one session with high past tense (307), and one 
session with low future tense (307).  
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High I Versus Low I sessions  
As many of the differences are not apparent in examining Low I sessions in isolation, the 
difference between Low I and High I sessions becomes clearer if we compare the two using the 
mean scores calculated from the outlying sessions. In comparing High I and Low I sessions, I 
took the average of each category and calculated the average Z Score difference for each 
category for these twelve sessions. See table 5. 
 
Table 5.  
Mean z score difference between low “I” and high “I” means by LIWC category  
High I Mean Low I Mean Mean Difference
Z I 1.50902 -1.33374 2.84276
Z you 0.45465 -0.66971 1.12436
Z we -0.69489 1.29208 1.98697
Z heshe -0.70221 0.310763 1.012973
Z they -0.67069 0.769505 1.440195
Z negation 0.982012 -0.63452 1.616532
Z verbs 1.316023 -0.77717 2.093193
Z affect 0.866968 -0.10762 0.974588
Z posemo 0.23008 -0.20716 0.43724
Z negemo 0.515233 0.084445 0.430788
Z anx 0.590465 0.233958 0.356507
Z anger -0.08328 -0.58513 0.50185
Z sad 0.856858 0.283782 0.573068
Z conj -0.95136 0.558073 1.509433
Z preps -0.93775 -0.18929 0.74846
Z present 0.989892 -0.60382 1.593712
Z past -0.62483 0.35925 0.98408
Z future 0.843773 -0.28901 1.132783  
 
In comparing High I versus Low I sessions, the largest difference by word class appears 
in examining the other pronouns. This is similar to Campbell and Pennebaker’s (2001) findings. 
For High I sessions, “you” use is also high, while “we,” “he/she” use, and “they” use are low. 
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For Low I sessions, four of the six are actually high “we” sessions. These Low I sessions tend to 
have a high “we” use, high “they” use, and low “you” use. “He/she” use is somewhat neutral. 
There is a also a noticeable difference between the first half of the analysis, where all three high 
“I” sessions from the first half of the analysis have a Z score above 2 while in the second half 
only one session has a Z score above one, with the other two sessions below one. For the Low I 
sessions, whereas two out the three for the first half of the analysis have “we” Z scores above 
one, in the second half of the analysis two out of the three sessions have “we” Z scores above 2. 
Given this relationship found, the following graph further illuminates some of the pronoun 
changes over time and showing that “I” dominant and “we” dominant sessions appear to be 
discrete entities, with “I” heavily used in the first half of the analysis and more “we” language 
used in the second half of the analysis. Pronouns then appear to show the most change when 
examining differences between High I and Low I sessions.  
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Figure 3. Mean z scores for “we” versus “I” across the analysis 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the pattern is similar for the LIWC categories for “you” versus “they,” where 
“you” occurs more in the first half of the analysis, and they occurs more in the second half as 
seen in Graph 3.   
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Figure 4. Mean z scores for “they” and “you” across the analysis 
 
Affect 
In looking at other categories, such as Affect, High I sessions tended to also score high in 
the LIWC overall category for Affect (sessions 31, 145), with two high (sessions 145, 308) and 
one low session (146) in the “positive emotion” category, two high (sessions 31, 321) in the 
“negative emotion” category, two high (sessions 31, 321)  in the anxiety category (with one low 
session, 146), one high session (146) in the anger category (with two low sessions 321, 324) and 
three high (sessions 31, 146, 324)  in the sadness category.  
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For the Low I category, we find that there are two high (sessions 33, 271) in the overall 
Affect category and two Low (sessions 4, 317). There is one high session (271) in the positive 
emotion category and two below (sessions 4, 317). There is one session above one (33) in the 
negative emotion category. There is one high anxiety session (317), one low anger session (4), 
and one low (317) and one high (33) sad session. Interestingly, while the High I sessions tend to 
have more in the overall Affect category, there is not too much difference between the sessions 
in terms of the positive/negative emotion categories, and angry, sad, and anxiety categories 
specifically (see table 11).  
 
Tense 
In terms of verb tense, High I sessions tended to score higher in the present tense, lower 
in the past tense, and higher, especially in  the second half of the analysis, with the future tense. 
Low I sessions tended to not have much of an association with tense, with two sessions below a 
Z score of one for present tense, one session above one for past tense, and one session below for 
future tense.  
 
Other categories 
Most other function word categories did not show as much of a difference as the 
pronouns. However, Verbs and the category for negation were both found to be higher in the 
High I sessions, while Conjunctions and prepositions were found to be lower. Conjunctions were 
found to be slightly higher in the Low I sessions, while verbs and negations were found to be 
lower.  
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Chapter 4. Qualitative Analysis  
Given a measurable change in self-reference in the “I” pronoun and “we” pronoun, an 
exploratory analysis sought to examine whether a relationship existed between the shift in “I” 
use and transference. As there is no external measure of transference available, a qualitative 
textual analysis examining selected sessions of the twelve sessions comprising High I and Low I 
sessions was used for hypothesis 4. 
Do outlying High I and Low I sessions differ in aspects of the structure of address? The 
structure of address will be looked at from the point of view of transference, with the hypothesis 
that the transferential relationship between the analyst and the patient is driving the changes in 
self-reference as measured by pronouns. In looking at High I sessions, the highest three as 
measured by the LIWC system for “I” from the first half (sessions 31, 145, and 146) and the 
highest three from the second half (sessions 308, 321, and 324) will be examined. Though all 
will be examined, I will go into depth for the High I sessions with session 31 and session 145 
from the first half and sessions 308 and 321 from the second half. Session 146 was omitted due 
to its proximity to session 145, session 324 was omitted as it is the final session.    
 For Low I usage, the three lowest LIWC “I” sessions from the first half are sessions 1, 4, 
and 33 and the lowest three from the second half are sessions 271, 307, and 317. Sessions 4, 33, 
271 307, and 317 will be looked at for the Low I sessions. Session 1 from the first half will not 
be looked at in depth as it is the first session.  In the qualitative contextual look at the sessions, 
patterns and themes will be looked for that link the sessions thematically, both within High I and 
Low I sessions respectively, as well as between High I and Low I sessions.  
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With that in mind, let us examine the common themes of conflicts that the patient 
presents and the common themes and interventions that the analyst uses in High I sessions. These 
themes, conflicts, and interventions will then be compared to the Low I sessions.  
 
High I Sessions 
Who are you? 
 
Session 31 
Session 31 takes place about 7 weeks into the treatment. It is on Friday after a Thursday 
break. The first thing the patient says is “do you switch chairs around on purpose?” This is the 
last hour before a week long break.  Here the patient makes direct reference to the analyst.  
The analyst asks why he would want to throw her off by confusing her with the chairs. 
She then discusses her “guilt” over “letting loose” in a previous session in discussing her 
enjoyment of playing volleyball. She then discusses her difficulty with accepting analysis, that 
she can’t even ask him where he is going and that she feels like she violated a “taboo” by seeing 
his face in the Wednesday before session. She goes on to talk about another common theme that 
comes up again from session 4: 
Well, the fact that that as long as, as long as I’m not happy as I’m not enjoying myself that the 
world’s going to be ok too, you know. Its going to go along fully but surely not if I start letting 
loose and I start being happy and if I start going out every once in a while and really enjoying 
myself and whatever; the company, the people I’m with or whatever we’re doing (sighs) that 
we’re going to get a depression [From the context of the session, she means an economic 
depression-Lentz]; like, I’ll get punished for it you know.  
The analyst interprets that she may fear he will side with her father, and say she is crazy. 
She discusses her concern that if she lets him in on her inside thoughts, he may think she is crazy 
and she continues in this vein after some clarification:  
I mean is that crazy? oh, it’s goofy, but that’s that’s, I don’t know what to think about myself 
when I; when I tell you that, you know. Geez. I don’t know what I did. You know, I don’t know if 
telling you what I really feel is right or wrong, you know, just ; I know that what you want to 
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hear but but...you might think I’m really crazy…I get scared, you know, that :well, maybe he’ll 
tell somebody that I should be put away.  
The above shows the high I usage, low conjunction, high verb, high negation, high you 
use, and low we use. The high you use is both from attempting to predict what the analyst is 
thinking (“I know what you want to hear”) and from the repetition of “you know” followed by “I 
don’t know.” 
She continues the session by recounting the guilt she feels for discussing her anger at her 
parents for things they have done. Inside the analysis, she is feeling abandoned by her analyst as 
he is about to leave for a trip and he won’t tell her where he is going, and they discuss what it 
might mean for her to become dependent on him. It is also the last session before a week long 
break. She may be trying to preemptively distance herself and abandon the relationship before 
she can be abandoned by the analyst for the break. She discusses feeling stupid for not knowing 
her own feelings and her guilt for talking badly about her mother in a previous session. She also 
discusses a conflict in sending the analyst a Christmas card. She “doesn’t know” if she can send 
him one or not. The analyst asks why she thinks he might object, and she states that he might not 
be happy to get one from a “lower class” person. 
The analyst interprets: mm-hmm. I think there are some aspects of this situation that are very 
irritating to you and that, in a way,   
Patient states: very degrading 
Yeah, okay, degrading, and degrading maybe, in a way, that to you feels an awful lot like  some 
of your complaints about your parents, that they, uh, as I understand it, you felt pushed around 
and as if they’re supposed to know everything about you, but you’re not supposed to know 
anything about them…and it seems to me you have similar feelings  here. You’re not supposed to 
know anything about me, not even such a simple thing as whether I ‘m going to a meeting or a 
vacation or God knows what or...uh, I guess the right word is the one you used, you feel 
degraded as if you’re being treated like lower class stuff even to the point that if you were to 
send me a Christmas card, you have the idea that “well, who the hell does she think she is?”  
He continues: 
It also reminds me of another way in which you’ve spoken about your relationship with your 
parents, you’ve said you’re so tied by their rules and that you think you ought to be able to make 
certain judgements of your own and abide by them…and here, you see, you’re doing the same 
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thing with me about the card; it’s as if you feel you have no right to think it through and make up 
your own mind to do, no, you’ve got to do what I want or even worse, as I say, it  
S such a put down because you feel that I would find it insulting even to get a card from you.  
She replies: I don’t know.  
They talk about if the doctor thinks she is nuts or if he thinks the treatment will work. 
They then talk about where she thinks he is going. She states that he uses words so much better 
than she does. He counters with stating that he thinks she is putting herself down. They talk 
about how she may miss him when he is gone and he interprets that she may be scared she is 
becoming dependent on him.  
The patient and analyst’s relationship in this session is marked and represents both a real 
and a transferential conflict. His not telling her how he will react to getting a Christmas Card or 
where he is going creates anxiety for the patient and she fills in the blank of his non-answer with 
a previous traumatic object relation. She also acts in ways to withdraw from the relationship. Her 
use of “I” in this session is both a retreat and an attack, as it becomes a way to isolate herself 
from the relationship, and therefore to isolate herself from the painful but unacknowledged affect 
generated by the impending break. 
Session 145 
In session 145, she is ten minutes late. This session is one of the highest in positive 
emotions at Z=1.61. It also has a very high discrepancy word score (discrepancy words are 
words like could, should, would). Her first statement is “I’m late. I know I’m going to lay here 
being bothered about something unless I ask you something.”  
She then asks to borrow money from the analyst. She is reeling from feeling angry at her 
husband the day before. She is also discussing leaving analysis and wanted to set a definitive 
termination date in session 144. The analyst lends her the money. After much questioning, the 
patient reveals it is her birthday. The husband has forgotten her birthday and the patient feels her 
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parents aren’t celebrating correctly. She expresses her conflict around her birthday feelings 
which explains the high positive emotion score and high negation score: 
Patient: It just boils down to (sighs) it’s so difficult sometimes to be happy about things, and that, 
that, that’s so wrong. Goddamn (pause) (Sighs) (Sighs) do you know why I’m supposed to be 
happy today-it’s my birthday. And I don’t feel happy about it. I’ve been getting cards and 
presents and I should be happy and I’m not happy and I don’t understand that. I’m happy to a 
point but I think I should be happier, that’s what’s upsetting me.  
In the middle of the session, the analyst has figured out it is her birthday, and interprets 
that he has given her a “birthday present” in the form of the money he has lent her, and he states: 
“then it seems to have to do with wanting one (a gift) from me then.” 
The patient replies: um, like I’m figuring what I would like for you to sit there and say 
“you know what? I’m going to give you your wish, you don’t have to come here anymore.” That 
would be the best present I think , of all.  
 
The therapist replies “you still feel you have to come here, don’t you? 
And the patient states: I I guess I am really afraid that I’ll hurt your feelings , I’ll never see you 
again and you’ll think I’m making the wrong mistake. 
The analyst then makes a transference interpretation: Yeah. I think that’s very important 
in connection with this business of liking, you have a feeling that, uh, if I like you, then you you 
acquire certain very powerful obligations towards me and you can’t, you’re no longer a free 
agent to come or not come or do as you wish because you’ll disappoint me and just mustn’t. My 
liking you make some kind of a slave to me.  
Patient: I don’t know how else to do it. I don’t know, I can’t even imagine not feeling like 
this, feeling you have to give so much or you have to always return things; always be careful of 
other people’s feelings or they won’t like you.  
The analyst interprets: as if nobody must be one up on you in terms of giving you 
something. Obviously, you know, I’m just repeating it but I think it can hardly be emphasized too 
much; you feel to be loved is a demand and you know it’s not hard to understand but apparently 
that was the essence of the way your parents treated you. They said they loved you and they 
made it perfectly clear that it meant you were their slave.  
The patient confirms that the interpretation works: I don’t know. It brings  a lot of 
memories that flood; them, I picture my mother and father doing doing different things, uh, my 
father sitting at the table saying, uh, he stands all day on his feet to bring the money and we have 
to appreciate it and we have to eat everything we’re given.    
Here again, as in session 33, there is a question of what is the real relationship between 
the analyst and the patient and the patient acts in such a way (by wanting to borrow money) to 
move the analyst out of a neutral stance. She is also communicating some disappointment in the 
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analyst, and her use of “I” may be her attempt at maintain separation from the analyst. The 
analyst, for his part, engages in the enactment by lending her money, but also interprets the 
previous object relation that may be interfering with her entering into a relationship with him. He 
is interpreting her defense against entering into a “we” with him.  In some way, she is asking 
“who are you?” And in another, she is saying “this is who I want you to be.” The analyst is 
saying you don’t want to be a “we” with me because this is what “we” has meant to you in the 
past.  
Session 308 
In session 308, the patient is three minutes late. She begins in relation to a question of the 
analyst’s: “Not too bad. I left a little earlier because I knew they were working on the expressway 
but I still got tied up in it. It’s a real bottle neck .” This is the first session back from a week long 
break. The patient discusses her wish to know where the analyst has been and her conflict in 
wondering. He also comments on her by asking if she has a new hairdo. She talks about her new 
hairdo and then brings up her desire to know where the analyst has been. 
She discusses her conflict: See? But then I get this conflict where, okay, we have here a 
contract or whatever, that I’m supposed to tell him what ever comes to my mind and this and that 
and everything else and it’s –it seems sort of unfair because some of the things I have are very 
personal and yet, I ‘m supposed to share them; the that’s part of the analysis, so you know, it’s 
not that I’m asking you to; to, you know, divulge any of your private life or anything, it’s just that  
, uh; if , if it is something of a common occurrence you know I figure maybe you’ll tell me. But 
some time I think it is common and you don’t, you know (laughs)… 
The analyst attempts to explain why he won’t answer her question. The analysand 
responds: Now that I can’t understand, That I’m under-because it seems dumb (laughs) and 
cruel, to not just be natural, you know, to another person, and it seems like, well, I relate it with 
the time I asked someone how the gas bill is paid and they tell you it is none of your business; 
that seems dumb and cruel because it is a simple explanation is all a human being needs… 
Here again, the patient is perhaps struggling to understand the difference between the 
analytic relationship and a regular relationship. She in some ways is attempting to assimilate the 
analyst’s answer into a previously formed relational schema rather than accommodate the new 
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relational information. The analyst discusses why he won’t answer the question and then 
interprets and this leads to misunderstandings.  
Analyst: I’ll start over. I have been away, this is the first session after my return. You 
have the idea before you come here that what you’d like to do is say; well, how you been, where 
you been something like that…and you would like for me to just answer that. Though you can 
understand that if it was something quite personal, I wouldn’t. My point is that I believe that 
you’re having had that idea beforehand that you’d ask me and wanting an answer, is a way of 
establishing a relationship between us, of a kind that would hide something else; that it would be 
worth finding out about. And that when I didn’t answer the question and you said that’s dumb 
and cruel, that’s a clue to something that could be hidden… 
The patient responds: That’s the part that’s really throwing me. When you’re saying that, 
nothing happens. I supposed something is supposed to happen if I’m hiding something … [the 
patient keeps thinking and states]… what would I be hiding and nothing happens and then I think 
about it a little more and then I remembered that article about, uh, uh, patient sand psychiatrists 
and so forth and I started thinking, is that what he means? Maybe I’m falling in love with him or 
something, I don’t know, because I was trying to find something because I cou ldn’t find 
anything… 
They then discuss how the patient was at one point in love with the analyst and had one 
“crazy afternoon” where she was sexually aroused because of their relationship. After some back 
and forth, he makes the following transference interpretation:  
I don’t know exactly how it fits in because it was, one of those things you said that struck 
me especially. That I, I have a feeling that you do feel quite strongly that I am behaving toward 
you the way they did and that if you said “how do you pay the gas bill?” they didn’t answer you 
or that they were always ready to see in you something in you, you were doing, something bad 
and sexual; that you were either masturbating or you’d gotten interested in a  boy in a  way that 
you shouldn’t; that they didn’t trust you and they were looking for hidden badness in you. I think 
you are reacting to my not answering your question and to my looking for,uh, hidden meanings 
in it as exactly the same thing and that that’s why you call it dumb and cruel, and I  would even 
say if it was a question of, you know, a simple how do you pay the gas bill, that my not answering 
that is dumb because you’re just asking for an ordinary piece of information and you should be 
enlightened. Or that my picking at it looking for some terrible thing that’s hidden there is cruel, 
and that, in a sense, you do have the feeling that I am behaving like they did and that the only 
difference is that you didn’t dare say to them; that’s dumb and cruel; though you would have 
wanted to, but you can, you dare say it to me, that’s dumb and cruel; but just as soon as I begin 
to try and examine it in the way that I do, you get scared, and you, maybe this is the one thing we 
could get out of it (laughs) that uh, the reason you didn't say to them it was dumb and cruel 
Patient: I know the reason (laughs) 
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The “reason” the patient points to, is her previous relationships.  Here again, the patient 
acts in a way to move the analyst from a neutral position and works to assimilate the relationship 
into a previously formed schema. The analyst resists this in order to do the analytic work of 
understanding the way the patient is attempting to “recreate the original scene of address” 
(Butler, 2005).  She confirms his hypothesis by stating “I know the reason” and goes on in the 
session to describe genetic memory of her relationship with her mother and father. 
 Session 321 
In session 321, she has skipped a session the day before, another separation, but oneshe 
had control over, and she has brought her children to the session. She begins the session by 
speaking to her children with: “you get to see everything from this height…that reminds me of 
this. I’m getting them slow but sure.” She then addresses the analyst: “Okay. Fourth of July got 
me with a firecracker, believe it or not…dangerous around our neighborhood.” This is three 
sessions before she decides to leave the analysis, and the session is very high for anxiety.  
They discuss the reason she missed her appointment the day before. The patient had been 
worried about sending her children to go swimming and had had an attack of her symptoms with 
nausea, diarrhea, and vomiting. She is also set to do a presentation for her new job as a cosmetics 
saleswoman and she discusses her conflict around doing the presentation. Person (her boss) 
thought I could do it. He asked me. I didn’t say yes. I didn’t say no. All I said was “I’ll try” 
(laughs) that’s all I keep saying. I hesitate but I say I’ll try. (Pause) (Sighs) last night nick says, 
“I know you like a book. You’re worried about that aren’t you? And I says “yeah.” He says, “I 
knew it, I knew it. 
The analyst asks why she didn’t come into the session when she was having her 
symptoms, as, that’s what they are there to treat. Finally she states “Well, I think what it is is I 
don’t want to hear you say I’m silly or foolish for not allowing the kids to go to the beach, you 
know, something like that and then after my friend had said that I still—I’ve got the confidence 
and I don’t have the confidence for the decision I made.  
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They discuss her conflict around whether choosing to not send her children to the beach 
was a symptom or not. Her conflict in the analysis is her concern that the analyst may think she 
has symptoms.  
The analyst then makes a transference interpretation: I think you regard the whole 
treatment-the whole- the fact that I take the position that you need treatment and that these are 
symptoms and that you’re more caution than necessary, I think—that for you that amounts to my 
saying you’re a rotten kid…and I’m sorry I ever had you. I think you didn’t come yesterday 
because you expected that I would say something that would make you feel just as bad as your 
father makes you feel when he says the kinds of things that he does about his children and that, 
in a way, even if only in the sense that I would say—here, we’ve been working together, you 
know, all this time and I’ve done my best to help you and you still have the same kinds of fears 
that you wouldn’t let the kids go swimming and you’re worried about the presentation tonight, 
you’re a rotten patient and I’m sorry I’ve ever gotten mixed up with you. That—if I would have 
said anything to the effect that I thought it was a symptom and so on, you wouldn’t have heard—
that wouldn’t have sounded to you, you know, like a doctor saying, you know, I’m sorry, you still 
have that trouble, and I guess we haven’t licked it yet so let’s work some more. I think that would 
have been meant to you my saying you’re a rotten patient and I’m sorry I ever took you as a 
patient and you’re just no damn good and no good is ever gonna come of you and why did god 
give me these rotten patients. 
She then says, you know the problem is I really believe some of that stuff . 
Here again, there is the conflict between the real and imagined relationship, the way she 
attempts to recreate the original scene of address, the real relationship between patient and 
doctor, and patient expressing a wish that the relationship was real, and what that relationship 
would look like. By refusing to gratify this wish, the patient then acts as if the doctor were the 
original frustrating or traumatizing object. The analyst uses this as an opportunity to point out the 
way that his refusal to make the relationship anything more or less than an analytic relationship 
is a result of her transferring previous relationships onto the analysis as per Levy’s (2012) 
description of a transference interpretation. These interpretations often come at crises points in 
the real relationship between the doctor and the patient. The patient, in this case, may also be 
reacting to being told she still has “symptoms” which under cut her feelings of mastery and 
confidence.   
70 
 
In sum, the analyst uses the high I/high affect sessions to interpret transference in the here 
and now relationship. High I sessions tend to occur either before or after breaks in the analysis. 
High I sessions tend to contain some kind of “acting out” behavior. There may be two things 
happening in these sessions. On the one hand, the patient is in some ways recreating the “original 
scene of address” (Butler, 2005) and is communicating to the analyst not in words but through 
transference something she has been unable to articulate about her genetic relationships. On the 
other hand, she is also insisting on separation and is defending against some disappointment in 
the transference object by not entering into another kind of relationship with the analyst- a “we” 
relationship. (Though not examined, the analyst’s speech is also full of “I” and “you” as seen in 
his interpretations in these sessions. He is not joining her in a “we” either, and this may serve to 
distance her as well, basically casting her out of a “we” relationship.) The analyst interprets her 
resistance to entering a relationship with him based on genetic relationships using Levy (2012) 
transference interpretations. With this in mind, let us now examine the Low I sessions and their 
relationship to High I sessions and transference. 
Contextually Low I Sessions 
Who are we? 
 
Low I Sessions 
In the qualitative contextual look at the sessions, patterns and themes will be looked for 
that link the sessions thematically. Session 4, session 31, session 271, session 307 and session 
317 will be investigated in further detail.  
 
Session 4 
Interestingly, the patient starts the session with “still don’t like this” with a notable lack of “I” to 
represent the self.  She talks about not wanting to come in that day. This is a low overall Affect 
session (Z score=-1.585) which may mean she is not really bringing her affect into the room. 
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They discuss if someone is supposed to enjoy seeing a doctor. As this is still early in the analysis, 
and only the second or third time she has lain on the couch, his statements are mostly orienting 
her to the treatment. The analyst discusses how they will approach her anxiety issues indirectly, 
and how he does not intend to direct what she talks about. His interventions are mainly about 
explaining analysis: 
Analyst: And also, as I explained to you there are things one, you have to learn about this 
process as you go along. I do not intend to direct you in any way in so far as your behavior is 
concerned. What effects will come from the treatment will be applications you will make of what 
you have learned.  
They discuss a dream of her children falling from a palm tree. This is the first dream 
discussed in the analysis.  He asks her to associate to the dream. He introduces what an 
interpretation will be like: 
When I express an idea, that’s all it is, an idea. It could be right. It could be wrong. And you’ll 
react to it one way or another. If you think it’s right, you’ll agree, if you don’t think it’s wrong 
and so on.  
They then discuss how important it is for her to make her own judgements.  
He makes a transference interpretation from the content of her dreams: 
So the idea of the palm tree is associated with your father …one of other reasons I was 
suggesting that maybe that’s tied up with your father is that, as you know, as I said, I think that 
since the dream may have something to do with your own fear of what will happen here, that 
would be a connection too because you have already said a few things that indicate that you’re 
afraid that I will treat you like he did…and I will be critical and scold you and say you’re 
worthless and a nothing and wave my hand and heaven know what else… 
She replies: Possibly. And uh and it I just feel that a lot of things he has done and my mother had 
done, really kinda changed my attitude about people and the way I do things. I’m –like it’s 
always like I’m out for approval. Uh, even in myself,--out for my own approval.. 
They continue to discuss this and she states, in relation to the analyst asking why she has a low 
opinion of herself:  
Well, I guess, all I can remember are things I’ve done wrong but I—you know, I get—and 
when I do things, I guess I feel I don’t –when they are right, they’re not 100% right—  
They discuss the reason she feels she is never right.  He replies, You see, one way of putting that  
 
would be to say you treat yourself like your father did.  
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She states “Right” and associates to when she was gardening the other day, her father 
came over and criticized her gardening.  
Interestingly, in the High I sessions, we do not get identification interpretations or the 
patient discussing how she has identified with significant objects in her life. So, while it appears 
this session contains a transference interpretation, the transference interpretation sessions do not 
contain an understanding of the way the patient may be identifying with significant objects.  
Session 33 
Session 33 begins with the patient stating “I don’t want to come here anymore. Would you 
believe that?” This is before a break in the treatment. 
She follows by discussing her relationship with the analyst explaining she might be afraid 
she has offended him for not wanting to come in. They talk about the fear she may feel in 
becoming intimate with him in a non-physical sense and they discuss the differences between her 
relationship with the analyst and her relationship with her husband. She then discusses her and 
her husband’s relationship, that she is angry with him, and that she is afraid the analysis may 
interfere with her marriage.  
Patient: Well, at least you could say now that I’m telling you what I’m thinking and instead of 
just thinking it inside, at least, I’m expressing it, you know. I’m just not (sighs) maybe it’s just 
because of Christmas and there’s so many other things that I want to do.  
She talks at length about her family and the analyst interprets that she may be concerned 
he will think her family is crazy. She then discusses trying to pick up a present for her husband, 
and discusses feeling mad at him. The analyst asks what she is mainly mad at.  
Oh, like my birthday and Friday night. See, that’s petty too. That’s like my parents, you know. I 
don’t tell him about I, you know, but I think about it inside sometimes, but that; you know, like 
that I just try and overlook things like that and say that’s silly and, you know, you don’t think like 
that and you just go on with the next day, you know. I don’t know.  
Here, as in session 4, there is some acknowledgement of identification with her parents. 
She is also using “you” here to mean “I,” which may be a difference between High I sessions and 
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Low I sessions, as there may be more flexibility in self-reference, where “I” becomes “you” used 
to refer to the self. The use of “you” here, as in the above example, is not really linked to affect; 
it is used as hypothetical or “what if” and as a way for her to think about how she relates to other 
people. She has some greater distance as a second person narrator of herself than as first person 
narrator. The analyst then makes a transference interpretation about her not being able to find the 
right present for her husband being like looking for the right thing to say in analysis, which the 
patient agrees with, but this is not really in line with Levy’s (2012) definition. It is commenting 
on a current rather than past conflict, though it does act to bring the discussion into the here and 
now of the analysis. The bulk of the session is taken up however by discussing relationships 
outside of the analysis and about how the process of analysis is done.  
Session 271 
She is four minutes late. She begins the session “hi, oh, life is life, I swear.” They discuss 
some of the goings on in the session the day before, and she states she has been asking herself 
about why she is so curious about the analyst. She then goes on to invite him to come to a winter 
dance she is holding and that she doesn’t know if she should give him one ticket or two, since 
she doesn’t know if he has a wife or not. They discuss a block party that she is involved in, and 
part of the high “we” score (Z score=3.257) for this session is her talking about her relationship 
with her husband. They then talk about how she would react if he did not go to the dance and 
what it would be like to end analysis, if they would continue to have a relationship or not. Part of 
the other high “we” score from this session is her using “we” to refer to herself and the analyst. 
The analyst makes a transference interpretation about her maybe feeling disapproved of as a 
person, if he did not go to the party, and that this would mean he was acting like her parents. She 
states that she would feel rejected.  
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She then discusses her conflict around feeling special: My parents, my dad especially, 
would would; if you do something, right away, right away, you’re a smart ass, you know, you, 
you, you’re better than him or something like that. And I don’t know, I get very, very confused 
because sometimes, well, now recently, I’ve been telling myself; it’s ok to feel the way you’re 
feeling. It’s only natural, like, uh, I forgot to tell you; I was feeling pretty lousy last night. But 
I’m getting to feel a little better about the day. I turned thirty last night. Today is my birthday. 
Believe it or not.  
  This turns out to be the one year anniversary of her birthday from session 145. She 
discusses feeling special and her conflict in feeling special, as it makes her feel like an 
“egomaniac.” She does her thing of asking if she should give him a ticket to a dance.  
I’m still really (sighs) you know, this; I’ve been doing this for years to people too if 
they’ve been acting somewhat I don’t even know what words to put in it anymore; that they were 
putting themselves ahead of people like my husband Nick for many years, many years; of course, 
he was on the selfish side too in some respects, But I would be doing what my father was doing 
and I’d be looking at them like; who, I mean they’re crazy for being that way; they’re wrong for 
putting themselves up high and they’re wrong and they would be more humble, you know.  
The patient here discusses her conflict of on the one hand, being an “egomaniac” and 
being disapproved of by her father, or on the other hand being like her father in identification. 
Though she brings up the idea of inviting the analyst to a party, she is able to use the analysis to 
think about both sides of an object relation. She discusses being like her father for the way she 
treats her husband, and articulates her conflict around feeling special because of the way her 
father had treated her but also acting like her father by disapproving of other people, including 
herself for being an “egomaniac.” In other words, in these sessions, she may be turning from a 
passive recipient to an active doer, while also thinking through past and current relationships. 
She is actually enjoying her birthday this year and she is able to feel positive feelings in her 
birthday in a far less conflicted way then she did a year ago, in session 145. During that birthday, 
Her family’s actions nearly led her to cheat on her husband out of anger for him forgetting her 
birthday in session 146, a High I session, whereas here she discusses how much more attentive 
her husband was this year, even staying up until midnight with her counting the minutes until it 
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was her birthday. This different attitude or different relational stance could be manifest in the 
higher amount of positive emotion (Z score=1.693) in this session and has the highest “we” 
usage of almost any session, with a “we” that includes the analyst as well as her husband and 
other significant relationships.  
Interestingly, as this is a high “we” session, the “we” refers mostly to her relationship 
with her husband. She also frequently uses it to refer to her relationship with the analyst. Here 
again, along with using “you” to refer to the self, as illustrated in the above quote, she also uses 
“we” for self-reference. This may be a pattern where High I sessions are using “I” more 
exclusively to refer to the self, whereas Low I sessions may have multiple ways of referring to 
the self, using “I,” “you,” and “we.” Using “you” as she does in the above quotation allows her 
to gain reflective distance and to think about how her father treated her, and how she sometimes 
acts like her father in relation to other people. 
Session 307 
She is three minutes late. This is the last session before a 6 day break as she is seeing the 
analyst less. It is unclear why they have decreased sessions, but it has been mentioned in passing 
in session 271 that they have reduced to twice a week. She begins: I went to the basement, then I 
went to the sixth floor. I got off and I ran there and opened the door and, all of a sudden, all 
these colors hit me. They got orange and blue and green, this ain’t the right floor.  
She goes on to discuss her improving mood and it’s relation to “PMA”, meaning positive mental 
attitude: I was asking myself, why don’t you get mad instead of getting hurt, you know. Then I 
asked myself; why don’t you stand up on your own two feet, you know, and, and not care and I’m 
going, well, I do care because my husband is the closest thing to me, you know, compared to any 
other adult, you know, like I could be myself and he’ll still be there even if I make big mistakes, 
you know. I guess the thought of losing him was more than I could handle. Then I asked myself 
the question: I look at myself in the mirror and I say; are you upset because Dr. Johnson’s 
leaving next week too? 
Interestingly, in using “you” here to refer to herself, she is commenting on the process of 
her coming to be able to observe her relationship to the analyst and to herself, to see herself 
outside of herself. This speaks to some internalization of the analyst and an increasing ability of 
the patient to think about her-self and her affective relation to others, as well as her relationship 
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with the analyst, Dr. Johnson (a pseudonym).  They discuss how she is doing better and better in 
a company she is working in, selling cosmetics. She talks about being angry at her husband for 
being out late the night before.   
He makes a transference interpretation that in discussing selling the product, if she might 
be discussing her relationship with him? 
 
…and here I was doing something good and I was thinking someone was going to come up and 
holler at me for; “what are you doing” you know, that type of thing. I think I’m doing; I’m 
carrying my father’s role and my mother’s role type of thing; that type of third degree. I’m 
carrying on their … 
The analyst asks: did you do anything of that sort last night in relation to his [her 
husband] being late? 
Hm…yeah. There was one small point where I was, I think I was sounding like my father saying; 
or my mother who got it from my father (laughs)… 
Here we have a session that does not have a Levy (2012) type transference interpretation, 
but does include reflection on her identifying with her parents, as well as being able to step back 
from her relationship with the analyst to think about her affect in relation to others. Most of the 
action of the session is again taking place outside of the analytic relationship, she is reporting to 
the analyst her thoughts and feelings about events outside of the room. This is a trend in the Low 
I sessions, where most of the action of the session concerns discussions of relationships outside 
the room of analysis.  
Session 317 
She begins the session 5 minutes late with “We’re all here today” meaning her children, 
whom are waiting in the therapy room. This is a very different session from 308 however, where 
she also brought her children. She had cancelled the previous appointment due to a sick child and 
had worried the analyst would be mad. Most of the action of the session, like the other Low I 
sessions, takes place outside of the therapy room. The patient discusses leaving her children to be 
babysat by her parents, and that she and her husband had come home to find the door unlocked 
and that her parents had asked the children to lie about it.  
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She talks about being able to do things on her own. The analyst interprets: Are you implying that 
the, um,fact, that you can deal with these situations without getting so upset means you’re better 
as far as the treatment is concerned, is that what you mean…both in regards to your parents and 
me? 
Patient: Yeah. If I’m not going to be taking my parents in some ways, I’m not going to be taking 
you in that direction either.  
She talks about going flying on a plane soon and that she is scared the plane will crash 
and she will die, and that she is blowing this fear out of proportion.  
The analyst clarifies: So you think to take the ordinary fear that you suppose, uh, a lot of 
people have who have never flown and you blow it up into this worst possible thing -as you said, 
like your parents, they uh—they couldn’t just deal with it on the level of the house and open door 
but right away they blew it up into this huge business that they can’t take proper care of the kids 
and you would think if the kids stayed with them if the kids would get killed and so on.  
She then discusses how in feeling good, she expects punishment. Interestingly, this has 
similar themes to session 4, which discusses her dream about children falling from a palm tree 
and how she expects to bring on a “depression” for feeling good. In terms of transference, it is 
interesting to note that she in some ways is bucking the idea of transference and beginning to 
reject the analyst. She is not going to take her parents in the real world, why would she continue 
to take him as well? Also, while anxiety is very high (Z score=1.678) in this session, the highest 
of the Low I sessions, it seems so is her ability to tolerate that anxiety. This could be because 
“we” is also quite high (Z score=2.035). The ability to share her anxiety, that is disperse her 
anxiety in a community of a “we” rather than be isolated and alone with her anxiety in an “I,” 
might make the anxiety more tolerable. It could also be anxiety about leaving the treatment and 
“performing” on her own (the content of her anxiety is concern over performing a work 
presentation), a step she will take when she leaves the analysis 9 sessions from this one.  
Summary of Low I Sessions  
 In the Low I sessions, there is less focus on the relationship between the analyst and the 
patient and more of an attentional focus on goings on outside the room, especially the patient’s 
relationships outside the room. In session 317, she discusses joining with her husband in her 
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anger at her parents over babysitting and asking the children to lie about it, in 307 it is primarily 
about her relationship with her husband and her work selling cosmetics, in 271 it is about a block 
party she is involved in planning, her family in session 33, and the dream in session 4. This 
suggests that the high “he/she” and “they” LIWC category scores for these sessions is a marker 
that the analyst and patient are discussing relationships outside the room. The analyst may still 
make a transference interpretation ins these sessions, but they are less likely to be in line with the 
Levy (2012) definition of linking genetic relationships to previous experience. Either the patient 
or the analyst is likely to remark on how the patient is acting like one of her parents.   
Summary of High I versus Low I sessions by context 
In the High I sessions, the patient seems to be feeling her feelings with some immediacy 
in the session and these often involve some conflict in her relationship with the analyst or a 
crises in one of her relationships outside of the analysis. In these sessions, she often acts or does 
something provocative. The patient often voices some conflict in her relationship with herself 
and with either coming to analysis or her feelings about being in analysis. She then acts in a way 
to assimilate her relationship with the analyst into a previous relational schema, at least in the 
opinion of the analyst, who interprets transference according to the Levi (2012) definition in 4 
out of the 6 High I sessions. This usually results from her either engaging in an enactment, which 
ranges from suggesting the analyst is trying to trick her in session 31 and not knowing if she 
should send him a Christmas card, to asking for money/birthday present in session 145, to 
dressing provocatively in session 146 while discussing seeing another man out of anger towards 
her husband, to bringing her children with her to session 308, and to bringing a firecracker with 
her in 321. In terms of enactment, this may relate to the high verb usage in these sessions in that 
she is set to act or is talking about acting, which she ultimately does in session 324 when she 
ends the treatment. Typically, while the patient is caught up in her real relationship with the 
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doctor and the rules of analysis, the analyst tends to interpret her feelings as transference, 
pointing out that she is assimilating rather than accommodating relational experience.  
The analyst plays a role as well, as he sometimes steers the conversation to external 
events and sometimes steers the conversation into the room by remarking on something the 
patient is doing or saying. In the High I sessions, he tends to do this by sticking with the 
enactment, for instance following up with the patient about why she might think he is trying to 
trick her by moving a chair in session 31, or why he might object to lending her money in session 
145. In session 308, he steers the conversation into the room by commenting on the patient’s 
hair. In Low I sessions, his line of query tends to follow the patient as he asks questions that 
attempt to clarify her relationships outside the room-for example in session 33 he asks questions 
to clarify why she might be mad at her husband and asks clarifying questions about certain 
relationships in her family, and in session 271 he asks questions about the patient’s role in a 
block party she helped to plan, and in session 307 he asks the patient about her work in 
cosmetics.  
The analyst attempts to remain neutral in some sessions but occasionally engages with 
patient in an action, such as in session 145 where he gives her money for parking and as a 
“birthday present” and in session 146 where he gives her direct advice and tells her to wait to 
contact the man she is thinking of contacting as an act of retaliation for her husband forgetting 
her birthday. These sessions, with the exception of 146, where he interprets her transferring 
feelings she has for her husband onto him, and 324, where he does not interpret her deciding to 
make that their last session, tend to have transference interpretations that align with the way 
Levy (2012) outlined them as linking present feelings about the analyst with unprocessed 
feelings about past formative relationships. For the analyst then, he is interpreting transference in 
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the here and now when affect is at its highest, as every High I session also scores above one Z 
score in one of the LIWC affect categories (Affect, Positive emotion, Negative Emotion, 
Anxiety, Anger, or Sadness). The patient, for her part, tends to in some direct way let the analyst 
know if the interpretation is correct or not by offering further associations or agreeing with the 
interpretation. She also in these sessions discusses her troubles with feeling good about herself, 
that is her self-esteem, and she tends to discuss conflicts in how she feels about herself, which is 
the essence of an internalized object relation. It is often her discussing her parent’s judgment of 
feeling good about oneself and how her in family, that is considered having too much “ego.”  
The Low I sessions often share similar content with the High I sessions, especially 
around feelings of self-worth, and about what it means to be in a relationship with the analyst. 
Session 271 for example follows this pattern where she invites him to a family dance. In this 
session, her use of “we” often includes the analyst, that is as a “we” inside the room, as well as a 
“we” that refers to her and her husband or her and her family. However, the content of these 
sessions is generally about people and affiliations outside of the room. In the Low I sessions, the 
use of “we” is quite high, as are “heshe” or “they” whereas the use of “you” is much lower. In 
terms of attentional focus as measured by “we” and “he/she” and “they,” the focus of these 
sessions is on relationships outside of the room, whereas in the High I sessions, where “I” and 
“you” are more dominant, the action is taking place between the analyst and the patient. The 
analyst may make an effort to bring the action into the relationship in Low I sessions, but these 
interpretations are not usually successful. (In session 307, for example, he interprets that in 
talking about her role in the company she is talking about her relationship to him.)  There are 
also a fair number of transference interpretations in the Low I sessions, but less in line with the 
Levy (2012) definition. When the analyst interprets, or when the patient becomes reflective 
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enough to bring it up herself, the content of the session becomes about how the patient is in some 
way acting like her parents towards either herself or someone else. In the High I transference 
interpretation sessions, however, there is rarely a statement by either the analyst or the patient 
suggesting identification. This is most likely due to the patient inhabiting one end of the 
transference spectrum in these sessions-genetic transference in child to parent, while in the Low I 
sessions she is in a post-oedipal identification position.  
Interestingly, these findings are in line with Foelsch and Kernberg (1998) in their 
thinking regarding transference focused psychotherapy and their and Ogden’s (1992) 
understanding of object relations as inhabiting both sides of an internalized relationship linked 
by affect. For example, if a child is neglected by an alcoholic father, but cared for by a mother, 
they may internalize both the angry uncared for child and the ineffective mother. In the data, this 
seems to occur and be the major difference between the High I and Low I sessions. In the High I 
sessions, the patient is acting as if she were in a historical relationship with her parents in the 
present tense with the analyst. She is feeling very strong affect and is working to act on that 
affect and may be attempting to enact a historical object relation and to recreate “the original 
scene of address” (Butler, 2005), something Butler points out is composed of an “I” and a “you.” 
In the Low I sessions, she is acting as if she were the parent in relationship to someone else , as 
this is remarked upon in the Low I sessions-I am acting like my parents. The action in these 
sessions is generally outside of the room, as the patient is discussing events outside of the 
analysis such as her work, family life, or civic life and generally has high “we,” high “he/she/ 
they” use, and low “I/you” use.  
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
Campbell and Pennebaker (2003) found that change in pronoun use in journal writing 
about a traumatic event was associated with improvements in health outcomes. However, these 
authors felt unable to explain the reason for this finding. The purpose of this project was to 
explore if there was a relationship between the change they observed in pronoun usage and the 
relationship with a hypothesized “other” such as might be observed in transference using 
sessions from a psychoanalysis focused on transference interpretations. Four main hypotheses 
were generated. The first was that inflexibility of language use could be observed using repeated 
Spearman’s Rho Correlations focusing on the LIWC category for “I” and the LIWC category for 
Function words if the data were split into a beginning, middle, and end phase. Typically, 
psychotherapy process research is broken down into the beginning, middle, and end phase of 
treatment in accordance with psychoanalytic process studies and short term psychotherapy 
studies. This break down into three phases is based on assumptions underlying pharmacological 
studies which assume both a linear and gradual change (Luyten, Blatt, and Horst, 2011).This 
experiment found a minimal difference from one phase to another, and actually showed that the 
end phase sessions of treatment were more correlated one to another than the beginning. While it 
is possible that these changes were not observed because the patient did not get better, this seems 
unlikely as she becomes noticeably more assertive in her relationships with her husband, parents, 
and analyst and she takes on more and more civic and work related roles, the content of which 
dominate the Low I sessions. It seems more likely that the limits are due to the use of the 
comparativly weak Spearman’s Rho and the nature of the breakdown of the data as discussed in 
the results section. However, this analysis led to a better understanding of the distribution of the 
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data available in the 48 sessions and led to the data being split into two parts for the subsequent 
explorations. 
When the data is split in half, changes in the LIWC category for “I” are readily observed. 
There does seem to be a marked decrease in “I” use across the analysis, and evidence for a 
movement in High I usage in the first half of the analysis followed by a steady drop in I over 
time, followed again by a brief uptick right before the end of the analysis. Indeed, the first half of 
the analysis is so heavy in the total “I” usage, that High I sessions in the second half do not 
exceed a Z score of one, meaning that the bulk of “I” use is found in the first half of the analysis.  
As “I” dominates in terms of Z Scores in the first half of the analysis, “we” in terms of Z 
scores tends to increase in the second half of the analysis. They also seem to switch places over 
the course of the analysis with “we” increasing in usage and “I” decreasing in usage over time. 
They also appear to never be high in the same session. Instead, they co-vary with High I sessions 
being low “we” sessions, and vice versa. With these findings, there does seem to be some change 
observed in the verbal behavior of the patient in regards to self-reference. However, given the 
limits of using descriptive statistics, we are unable to state if this is a significant change over 
time.  
In the third hypothesis, other changes in speech associated with two different self-other 
states were observed. In terms of pronouns as measured by the LIWC system’s pronoun 
categories, co-occurring with the “I” self-reference state was the pronoun for “you” (also 
sometimes used for self-reference), while in the Low I self-reference state, four out of six were 
actually high “we” sessions, where “we” co-occurred with “they” and “he/she.” Further, High I 
sessions tended to be lower in “he/she/they,” higher in “you,” higher in negation, higher in verbs, 
high in all affect categories, high in present tense, high in future tense, and low in conjugations 
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and prepositions. Low I sessions tended to be higher in the use of “he/she/they,” low in “you,” 
low in negation, low in verbs, also high in some affect categories, and lower in present and future 
tense. Low I sessions had more conjugations, similarly low preposition use, and somewhat 
neutral difference in the use of past tense.  
From the fourth hypothesis, the qualitative examination of the High I sessions (4 out of 6) 
tended to be associated with Levy (2012) type transference interpretations while Low I sessions 
(5 out of 6) tended to be associated with some type of comment by either the analyst or patient 
that there was an identification going on with an internalized object, as in session 4 when the 
analyst states “You see, one way of putting that is would be to say you treat yourself like your 
father did”, session 33 when the patient observes that she’s being “petty” towards her husband 
and “that’s like my parents, you know.” Similar comments by the patient or analyst is present in 
session 271, 307, and 317 as shown in the qualitative section.  Given these findings and their 
hypothesized link to transference, it is worth investigating these two language categories further.  
 
High I Sessions 
With the decrease of LIWC category “I” use over time, and the increase of “we,” is it 
possible to say that the patient’s mental health improved over the course of the analysis? High I 
sessions tended to be lower in he/she/they, higher in you, higher in negation, higher in verbs, 
high in all affect categories, high in present tense, high in future tense, low in conjugations and 
prepositions. High rates of use of the first person singular pronoun have been found to be related 
to higher rates of depression, social anxiety, marital dissatisfaction, and neuroticism 
(Zimmerman, Wolf, Bock, Peham, and Benecke, 2013) as well as successfully completed 
suicides in poets (Stirman and Pennebaker, 2001), and depression (Bucci and Freedman, 1981; 
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Rude, Gortner, and Pennebaker, 2004). Zimmerman et al. (2013) also found, using transcribed 
psychodynamic interviews with predominantly female, inpatient participants, that high first 
person singular use was related to an elevated interpersonal distress and an intrusive personality 
type on a measure of interpersonal style (The Interpersonal Problems Circumplex, or IIP-C,, 
Aldin Wiggins, and Pincus, 1990). Patients who scored highly on this measure described 
themselves as inappropriately self-disclosing, attention seeking, and unable to spend time alone. 
Chung and Pennebaker (2007) also found that higher use of first person singular pronouns was 
associated with a “self-focus” rather than “other” focus. What seems to happen in the analysis 
then, is a move from self-focus, to other focus, and in the final sessions given the overall arc of 
High I use, a move back to a “self” as separate and withdrawing from the analysis. Given that the 
High I sessions tend to occur before or after a break, and given that the “I” itself is a separate-
that is-apart from the “we” of a community-the “I” seems to be a self-state of separation and 
withdrawal from the relationship rather than one of joining with the analyst.  
Negation and verbs were also high in High I sessions. Negation has been found to be 
linked to defensiveness (Weintraub, 1981, Bucci, 2002, Halfon, 2012) and theoretically, is one of 
the hallmarks of resistance (Freud, 1925).  In the same paper, Freud describes thought as “a pre-
cathexis to acting.” Verbs are the language of action and from the qualitative examination, these 
sessions include what might be thought of as “acting out” behavior on the part of the patient. 
Verbs are high, for example in her building up to leave the analysis in session 321 and 324, as 
well as in Session 146, where she discusses acting on her anger at her husband  by contacting a 
man in order to sleep with him.  
As there is no outside measure of transference for these sessions, we cannot say 
definitively that this type of language (high first person pronoun use, high “you” use, high 
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negation, high verb, low preposition and low conjunction) as language indicative of a 
transference state. However, the analyst does consider these sessions to be transferential in that 
he consistently interprets the patient’s language as transference in these sessions, and more 
closely follows the Levy (2012) definition of linking past relationships to present feelings and 
behavior felt towards the analyst. The LIWC categories for overall affect (overall Affect, 
positive/negative affect, sad, mad, anxious) becomes interesting then, as “I” is associated with 
“you,” in the present tense in three out of the six High I sessions, with each High I session also 
being high in at least one of these affect categories. As Butler (2005) points out in “recreating the 
scene of address,” this takes place in the interpersonal space of “I” and “you,” where in High I 
sessions the affect is in the room from “I” to “you” with high verbs, perhaps meaning that there 
is an underlying relationship being “acted out” with high affect of the “I” that “cannot narrate 
itself,” as Butler (2005) argues, but can only communicate through transference. The patient may 
be unconsciously working to create the genetic “you” that defined the “I.” In another possible 
explanation of High I use, Zimmerman et al. (2013) hypothesizes that first person singular 
pronoun use may reflect the “tendency to seek attention from others rather than self-focused 
attention (pg. 223).” The authors elaborate to say that rather than being self-regulating, High I 
use may be field regulating, where “field regulation denotes the fact that interpersonal behaviors 
tend to pull or evoke complementary responses from others, thereby regulating the interpersonal 
situation (pg. 223).” In both Butler’s (2005) understanding of the role of “I” in creating “you,” 
and in Zimmerman’s, there is an inflexibility in relating to the other in the dyad. In both 
conceptualizations, as linked to first person singular pronoun usage, there is an unconscious 
attempt to control the “you” in the relationship, either by asking for positive feedback or by 
attempts to turn the other into the “you” of transference. (In a more reflective state of mind, as in 
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session 4, the patient is able to articulate this by stating “I am always out for approval.”) In either 
case, the “you” is interpolated into a relationship with predefined parameters of behavior.  
Whereas Zimmerman et al. (2013) focuses on the here and now, and do not focus on 
genetic transference, Butler (2005) makes explicit the link to a transference that is necessarily an 
unconscious act predicated on the analyst’s ability to disrupt this externalized relationship that 
results in change. In other words, the use of “I” is a somewhat unconsciously rhe torical position, 
where the “you” in the relationship is cast into a predefined role created from the patient’s past. 
Both Zimmerman and Butler refer to a rigidity in the relationship of “I” to the “you” in the 
relationship, where the speaker is attempting to act on the listener. Given the available evidence, 
this is quite a different stance from the self-other stance of the Low I position, especially as seen 
in the “we” sessions.  
 
Low I Sessions 
The first person plural pronoun “we” has been found to be related with commitment and 
interpersonal closeness (Agnew et al., 1998), relationship quality (Abe 2009), marital 
satisfactions and positive problem solutions in marital interactions (Rohrbaugh, Shoham, 
Skoyen, Jensen and Mehl, 2012), positive mental health (Chung and Pennebaker, 2007), a more 
“dominant” social position (Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon, and Graesser, 2014), and can be 
thought of as being “embedded in social relationships” (Zimmerman et al. 2013, pg. 223). Both 
Pennebaker (2011) and Zimmerman et al. (2013) found that those with overall higher use of 
“we,” “us,” and “our” had significantly lower rates of depression. Zimmerman et al. (2013) 
argued that the patients who used first person plural pronouns more were “negatively associated 
with interpersonal distress” and that in terms of their personality measure (The Interpersonal 
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Problems Circumplex, or IIP-C, Aldin, Wiggins, and Pincus, 1990) they found that first person 
plural pronouns reflected “the (adaptive sic) tendency to balance social pressures and one’s own 
social needs (pg. 223).” In other words, “we” can represent a more healthy self-other position, 
and it would appear, given the graph of the movement from Heavy I use in the beginning of the 
analysis to the lower I use and heavier we use, that the patient changes from a more 
interpersonally vulnerable position to a more interpersonally assertive or “dominant” (Kacewicz, 
et al., 2014) position. The “we” self-other stance is a more cooperative self-other stance based on 
a shared reality. It is worth noting that session one is both a Low I session and a high “we” 
session. The content of this session is generally a negotiation between Doctor and patient; it 
focuses on the proscribed relationship of these mutual objectively agreed upon social roles, 
perhaps rather than a projected subjective transferential relationship. The true Low I session, 
Session 4 which is not a high we session as assessed by Z score, has similar content where the 
doctor is instructing the patient in how analytic work is done. There is less negation, meaning 
less defensiveness or resistance. There is less use of verbs, perhaps meaning less of an urge to 
act.  
The use of “we” then maybe a different stance than a transference stance the way Levi 
(2012) describes it. Affect is still high, but the affect is perhaps felt with the analyst rather than 
against the analyst as the affect is directed outside the room at he/she/they, and, attentionally, the 
analyst and the patient are not talking about their own relationship, and the patient is not 
speaking to bring attention to herself, but they are talking together about relationships outside the 
room. Theoretically then, “we” use versus “I” use may have implications for further studying 
levels of transference saturation, in the Bionian (1962) sense. Rather than being two separate 
self-other states, the level of “I” use may rather be on a spectrum showing a desire for affiliation 
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in the “we” stance and a desire for separation in the “I” stance. This affiliation/separation 
spectrum may be governed by something like transference saturation, where the more the patient 
(re)experiences the immediate relationship as a recapitulation of a genetic relationship, (or works 
to recreate the “original scene of address “Butler 2005), the higher the “I” will be. A higher use 
of “we” may be a signal on the patient’s part that they are moving towards affiliation and away 
from a need for separation. The patient and analyst are in a different relational stance from a 
transference relationship in Low I sessions, or at least an ancillary relationship to a transference 
relationship. There is some evidence (four out of six sessions) that “we” represents a different 
self-other stance (as does Low I usage, five out of six sessions), one marked by identification 
with significant figures from the past as either the analyst or the patient remarks on this in the 
content of the sessions. This will be discussed more in the theoretical discussion.  
One surprising finding came in the affect categories, where, though the overall LIWC 
category for Affect nearly showed a Z Score difference of one (Z score difference was 0.975 on 
average between High I and Low I sessions, see table 5), not much difference was found in 
negative (Z Score difference 0.437) or positive (Z Score difference 0.431) affect. There was a 
very little difference on average in these other Affect categories (Anxiety Z Score difference 
0.357, Anger, Z score difference 0.502, and Sadness, Z score Difference 0.573)between the High 
I and Low I sessions. That is to say, for these sessions negative and positive affect was still 
experienced in this self-other stance. Only in the Low I sessions, it is not as tied to past, present, 
or future tense and appears more free floating in time. In this way, affect is felt not in an “I” in 
relation to either a real or projected “you,” but is felt with the analyst. “We” are feeling these 
things (which for the patient may mean “we” as a family or we as husband and wife or we as 
patient and analyst) together, rather than “I” am feeling this against or towards “you.” It is a 
90 
 
language of shared experience in a larger than singular social unit (as represented by “I”). High 
“we” may be a language of community and of objectively shared experience rather than of 
subjectivity and separation. Lower verb use in these sessions may mean less of a need to act on 
the felt emotions. The High I sessions then may show a higher intensity of feeling feelings in the 
room against the analyst in transference, whereas Lower I and higher we sessions may show a 
less transference saturated session signaling a more flexible ability to affiliate with the analyst.  
The present study provides evidence for the utility of assessing “I” and “we” as a 
measure of therapeutic progress. Furthermore there does seem to be a relationship between the 
“I”/“you” self-other stance and the state of the transference, as theorized by Butler (2005). There 
also appears to be a different self-other state in the “we”/“they” or “we/he/she” stance (or 
perhaps located as two ends of a spectrum governed by transference saturation), as these 
pronouns suggest that the action of these sessions is outside the analytic room. There also seem 
to be implications that a heavy use of “I” could be a barrier to entering a relationship and that 
through transference interpretations, the analyst may be able to help the patient enter into a 
relationship with him by bringing those previous barriers to intimacy and affiliation to light. 
Given the rise in “I” use before the patient’s ending of the therapeutic relationship, “I” use could 
also be a signal that one is leaving a relationship. It could also signal that the analytic “we” has 
broken down, and that some sort of repair is needed on the relationship to reestablish the “we.”  
 Given this evidence of changes in language and especially in pronoun use, an argument 
can be made that the patient’s mental health improved. There seems to be a relationship between 
this improvement and the patient’s ability to move from an “I” position to a “we” position within 
the analysis. Further, this change was imbedded in the process of the therapy itself. This ability 
relates to the relationship that the patient has with her analyst, and analyst’s ability to interpret 
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past barriers transferred onto the analyst that are interfering with forming a relationship with 
him, indeed, barriers to affiliating and becoming a “we” with him. This leaves however, the 
question of why the patient decided to leave the treatment. Given that “we” points to a shared, 
objective, communal reality, further considerations of the “I” and “we” positions are undertaken 
in the theoretical considerations section in order to better understand the patient’s decision.  
 
Theoretical Considerations 
In my original consideration of the origin of transference (see the theoretical section), 
there is the self (I) in relation to an objectification (me) that is projected onto the analyst (you) 
through transference. The relationship within the self is related via metaphor, or the transitional 
play space, a play area between internal and external, subject and object that is originally the 
space between the baby’s internal needs and the external mother’s recognition (or 
misrecognition) of those needs. The structure of language, as illuminated through function words 
then becomes important in the way the patient attempts to act on the analyst in order to recreate 
an archaic object relationship. In function words, rather than in content words, there is a 
discernible structure that can be measured according to Pennebaker’s (2003) method, as the “I” 
attempts to act on the “you” through “me” to see “me” externally as I was once seen and 
objectified. While this study found evidence for this process in pronouns and pronoun’s 
relationship to transference, I had neglected to consider the “we” pronoun given that the findings 
suggest change from the “I” position to the “we” position back to the “I” as seen over the course 
of the analysis.  
For Butler (2005), in transference, the “I” creates the “you.” Behind this rhetorical you is 
a “real” you, however, in the subjectivity of the analyst, as Winnicott (1958) wrote, “waiting to 
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be discovered.” This seems to be the realm of the high I/you sessions, where the analyst is yet to 
be discovered as the patient interpolates the analyst into a preexisting role, a “mirror” role, the 
role of the “you” that defines the “I.” In order for the patient to understand this “recreation of the 
scene of address,” the analyst must act in some way to disrupt the process and bring the patient’s 
attention to this creation of previous relationships in the here and now relationship with the 
analyst. This enables the patient to take a step outside the self to view the self, to take an 
“objective” look at the “subjective” self, what Ogden (2001) writes as a “more reflective position 
(pg. 37).” Freud (1925) argues that this is the heart of resistance; an insistence that the subjective 
reality of the patient, the subjective reality of transference governed by the pleasure principle, is 
an objective reality. In order to take an objective look at oneself through the lens of the 
supposedly neutral analyst, one necessarily has to have or develop the ability to enter into a “we” 
position of a shared “objective” reality. At the same time this admits of a separate individual 
with their own subjectivity. The patient has to have the ability to relinquish some idea that the 
“I” position is all there is, that subjective reality is the only reality. The “we” position, both for 
Moss (2001) and as demonstrated in the analytical data of this study, seems to be related to the 
process of identification rather than earlier, more primitive forms of interaction. Rather than 
requiring the other to act as a mirror that defines the self, the “you” that creates the “I,” in a “we” 
position one is able to identify parts of the self in the other in a shared community with known 
and agreed upon parameters. For example, in the first session, both members of this community 
of two know and agree upon who is the “patient” and who is the “doctor” within the agreed upon 
frame of treatment.   
Identification, however, may not always be a good thing. Moss (2001) argues that a “we” 
can also be a mechanism for repression when he states that sometimes, in order to be a part of a 
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“we,” “we” have to dissociate “not me” parts of the self and project them onto others. As an 
example, he cites homophobia coming from people who have unresolved homosexual desires or 
misogynistic prejudices projecting that “not me” (gay, feminine) part of the self onto others, 
where the first person singular “I want” becomes the first person plural “we hate” (pg.1315). 
While this patient’s symptoms are not related to homophobia, they are related to the patient’s 
genetic experience of “we,” where being part of her abusive family has meant identifying with 
the aggressor-her parents-against herself. While I agree with his thesis, I believe what is missing 
in some ways is that this mechanism also works like introjection and projection, in Bionian 
terms, on the part of the patient as the patient’s unconscious recreation of events from the past 
become understood and resolved in the analysis, where the patient is able to identify with the 
analyst outside the subjective reality created from maladaptive transference relationships. For 
Moss, like Kacewicz et al. (2014), a “we” position is a way to establish a place in a social 
hierarchy.  
…when we hate-racistly, homophobically, misogynistically, we are hating not as isolated 
individuals but as part of a group; not in the first person singular but in the first person plural. 
Within the sphere of these hatreds, “I” hate not as “I” alone, but as a white person, straight 
person, a man. Our hatred is directed, as it were, taxonomically downward. Disidentification 
downward, identification upward; this dynamic may seem to offer the only purchase against 
taxonomical descent.” (pg. 1317) 
 
For the patient, a “we” position has traditionally meant identifying with her parents-often 
this meant identifying with her parents against herself, “taxonomically downwards” in “fixed, 
transference-based taxonomical hierarchies” (pg. 1317). In a “we” position, one is able to take 
part in a relationship where the other person is “like me” in that there is something common in 
the relationship that both parties of the “we” identify with, an “objective” reality that is 
communally constructed and agreed upon rather than the “subjective” insistence of reality in a 
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transference position. In a transference interpretation, “we” agree “objectively” that the patient’s 
subjective reaction to the analyst is just that-subjective and coming from the patient. To use 
Moss’s (2001) language, the patient identifies with the analyst in a “we” “upwards” and dis-
identifies with the self that is enacting the transference. For Moss, analysis is inherently 
egalitarian and allows for another type of relationship to self and other to develop with the 
analyst and with oneself outside the hierarchy in which transference taxonomically locates the 
patient. Analysis, according to Moss, “is grounded in identifications,” and the work of analysis is 
“the owning, usually against resistance, of the ‘not me’ aspects of our mental lives (pg.1317).” 
For Moss, this is resolved when we are able to recognize within ourselves both the hater and the 
hated, and how mentally we have constructed our perceptions to keep these parts of the self 
separate.  
The key word here is “constructed” reality, as the “we” is a constructed self-state made 
up of identifications and dis-identifications. Waldron et al. (2004) wrote of the relationship in the 
analysis used in my study that:  
“Despite her improvement, her analyst thought she would have benefited from further 
work. Our raters concurred. Generally, they thought that the analyst-patient interaction was 
negatively influenced by this male analyst's imposing presence, towards which the patient 
seemed unusually compliant. They also thought that the analyst emphasized transference analysis 
in ways that were often not meaningful or useful to the patient (pg. 454).”  
 
Given the analyst’s copious use of transference interpretations in the analysis of this 
patient, a “high risk” intervention normally according to Hogeland et al. (2006) as it carries the 
risk of alienating the patient, it is possible the analyst over did it or was insensitive to when the 
patient could not tolerate it. An inaccurate transference interpretation can become a 
“misrecognition” in the Lacanian (1954) sense. That is, it runs the risk of labelling of affect 
inaccurately and even when not inaccurate, the timing may be important. As Waldron et al. 
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(2004) found, it was not the intervention as much as the timing of the intervention coming from 
the analyst’s attunement to the patient that resulted in positive therapeutic change. It appears in 
the course of this analysis, that the mutually agreed upon reality of the “we” began to fray at 
some point as the patient, through her use of “I” in the latter sessions, begins to signal her 
withdrawal from the relationship. While this negation of the patient’s subjectivity is in some 
ways necessary to analysis, it must be an accurate negation (this is your reality, the analyst is 
saying, not our shared “objective” reality).  In other words, the patient had enough of her 
subjective reality being negated, and began to disidentify with the “we” that they had created. 
Some evidence of this is seen towards the end of the analysis in session 317 when she says “I’m 
not going to be taking my parents in some ways, I’m not going to be taking you in that directions 
either.” In this, she is saying look, I understand genetic transference and it is somewhat resolved. 
But she is also saying I understand reality in the here and now, and if I don’t have to take my 
parents anymore, I don’t have to take you either. In other words, she may have more accurately 
been able to see what was her subjective reality, and what the analyst was subjectively doing and 
she decided to leave the relationship. 
Another key word of Moss’s (2001) in regards to analysis is “egalitarian,” as in the 
“overbearing” nature of the analyst, and in terms of the analytic third of ideology and culture, 
there is something to be said for the gender relationships that are enacted in the room of this 
1970’s analysis. As the patient decides to leave the analysis in session 324, near July 4th, 1976, 
an act the analyst interprets as a “declaration of independence,” the patient leaves the analysis.  
She reports that she “fears” her judgment might be different from his about ending the 
relationship, and that he might come on “strongly” about it. By leaving, however, she asserts that 
she trusts her judgment enough and that she is “independent” of either the need or the fear of the 
96 
 
analyst’s judgment, just as she has freed herself, though the analysis, from the fear or need for 
her parent’s judgment. Interestingly, the High I of this session and the previous High I session of 
session 321 are strongly linked with the future tense, lending this “I” a different quality than the 
High I of the present tense which dominated the High I sessions from the first half of the 
analysis. Having gone through the treatment, and having her “I” or ego be reconstituted 
somewhat during the course of the analysis, we may suppose that the “I” had a chance to 
therapeutically reformulate itself into a more agentive actor.  
This movement of the patient to leave the analysis allows some comments on 
transference interpretations proper. If the analyst is wrong in the interpretation, or they are not 
attuned to timing their interventions, the analyst may risk recreating the very misrecognition that 
caused the problem in the first place. In this analysis, the patient may have found the “object 
waiting to be found,” in the Winnicottian (1969) sense, and in finding the analyst past her 
transference distortions, did not like who was there. She may have seen what Waldron et al. 
(2004) saw-that the analyst was overbearing, and that it was not just her transferential/subjective 
experience of him. The patient may well have benefitted from the interpretation of her subjective 
analytic transferences. However, the whole analysis may have been an enactment of the pre-
women’s liberation/pre-sexual revolution gender roles of men and women in this particular time 
and place, one that may seem obvious to a contemporary reader, and one that was probably 
operating in many different relationships of the female patient. By leaving the analysis, the 
patient may have been leaving an interpolation or construction on the part of the analyst based on 
gender relations; less an unanalyzed countertransference than an ideological “third” (Altman, 
1995) of more contemporary theory.  
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Finally, my findings provide some evidence for how thinking is constructed. Thought, in 
the object relations understanding I am arguing for, is always a “scene of address (Butler, 
2005),” where even in “thinking to oneself,” the thought is directed from a speaker to a listener, 
even if both the speaker and listener are part of a single self.  Unlike the I/you position, wrapped 
up as it is in transference control, and dichotomous separation (I am I because you are you) that 
the “we” position includes parts of the speaker that are both internal (first person) and external 
(plural), and includes parts of the addressee that are both internal and external (the part of the self 
that one identifies with in the other to form a “we”). Those non-present must necessarily be 
symbolized, as they are not physically in the room, so to speak. The external/internal features of 
the “we” is similar to the “transitional space” as defined Winnicott (1953), where the internal 
world and external world mingle in a community of “we.” In this stance, one can “play” with the 
boundaries between self and other without an insistence on the “other” performing a predefined 
role. 
In this way, when the patient joins the analyst in a “we,” the patient has an opportunity to 
take a look at herself from a removed, objective positon, from the position of self in the other, a 
common self that is mutually created and shared. The “we” then may be a much less resistant 
therapeutic stance when the “we” includes the analyst. The patient is able to move into the 
external part of the “we” to look at the internal part of the “we.” This may lead to changes in the 
“I,” as one moves from a subjective judgment to a more objective judgment.   
For Butler (2005), it is impossible for the “I” to narrate itself fully, as in the I’s narration, 
and in it’s recreation of the scene of address, the “I” cannot know that it is recreating the 
“original scene of the address” because it is inherent to the I/ you dynamic. For Freud (1925), 
there will be resistance to acknowledging that the patient’s reality is subjective rather than 
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objective reality, with the ego, the “Ich,” the “I,” as seat of judgment. In both cases, the difficulty 
of the “I” rather than the “we” to observe the self is made apparent, as it would be like asking a 
telescope to look at itself. It is only in the relationship where the “you” projection can be brought 
to the attention of the patient that it can be disrupted/interpreted etc. in the enactment of the 
object relationship. In this arrangement, the other acts as a predetermined mirror, and continues 
as the “undiscovered” object of Winnicott (1953). For Butler, the “I” creates the “you,” and 
necessitates that the analyst be able to observe the “you” with the patient, which is what we see 
in the High I sessions. Given the prevalence of I in the first half, and the we in the second half, it 
would appear that building that alliance and trust is a process, as is the playing out, mutual 
recognition, and then diminishment of the transference distortion.  
In terms of flexibility in identification, it would appear that both the High I and Low I 
positions are important-as it is the ability to flexibly move from one position to another, from 
inside the group to outside the group when the group begins to threaten the cohesion of the self. 
For Freud (1925), the matter of the patient’s ability to take a more “objective view” of oneself 
via the analyst’s neutral stance is the seat of reality testing. The judgement of this reality lies 
with the patient and her ability to see the world through her supposedly more objective analyst. 
However, in a more relational point of view, it is more the ability of the analyst and patient to 
discuss and understand their roles in constructing the reality of their relationship, and something 
the analyst in this analysis does not reflect on. In this analysis, the analyst has been described by 
other writers (Waldron et al 2005) as “overbearing” and those same author’s argue that this 
attribute of the analyst probably led to a premature termination of the patient’s analysis.  
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Relationship to Transference Interpretations 
Hogeland et al. (2006) remarks that the transference interpretation can be a risky 
intervention; this analysis supports that view. While it can be argued that the transference 
interpretations led to health improvements as measured by a move from I to we use, this gain is 
lost when the patient decides to end the analysis and separates back into an “I” in the final 
sessions. The transference interpretation itself, or rather, at least this analyst’s repeated use, 
could be seen as an impingement, or misrecognition. For Waldron et al. (2004), they found that 
the type of intervention used (clarification, confrontation, interpretation, transference 
interpretation) wasn’t as important as when the intervention was made. As per their raters, the 
more attuned the analyst was to the patient, the better the quality of the intervention, with no 
significant differences for the type of intervention.  
Interestingly, if this is the case, the analyst’s following of Gill (1979) in continuing to 
interpret transference so often, so repeatedly, and so far into the analysis that leads to trouble 
rather than stating how important he is to the patient; as a real, subjective person, as a “new 
object,” in the Loewald (1969) sense, or as someone the patient has “discovered” in the 
Winnicottian (1968) sense. The analyst’s continued insistence on interpreting as subjective what 
might have at that point been objective (Waldron et al., 2005) is what might have led her to end 
the analysis prematurely, as it marks such a mis-attunement to what the patient may have felt. In 
terms of implications for technique, the patient’s move to more consistent “we” usage could have 
been a signal to the analyst to change his style of intervention with her to a more relational, two 
subjectivities in the room style, rather than a “blank-slate” approach. As Waldron et al. (2004) 
suggest, it may be about timing and attunement that marks a quality intervention rather than the 
type of intervention. Given this, a High I session may mark the right time for exploring the 
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transference and making a transference intervention. A high “we” session may mark a time to 
make a different type of intervention, and might be interpreted by the analyst as a time to pull 
back and to give “unsaturated” interpretations.   
 
Limits of the study 
There are a number of limitations to this study. As with all case studies, there is a 
problem with generalizability. As this is one analyst working with one patient, it is difficult to 
know if these findings could be found in another treatment under similar conditions. While there 
are many technical reasons for this, two reasons are most relevant for my study. One problem is 
the relative weakness of some of the findings-I can speak of trends but have no way of defining 
the statistical significance of these findings or if they are that different really. Another is found in 
the limits of the data available, as there was there was no true middle section to the data included 
in my analysis. Out of a total of three hundred and twenty four sessions, over one hundred were 
not included. Unfortunately, there is no way to know what happened in those sessions or to know 
if that is where the change from “I” to “we” occurred, and it does not help to explain the 
hypothesized therapeutic action that lead to this change. A further issue in terms of 
generalizability is that the analysis take place in English. It is unclear if the findings in terms of 
pronouns would hold up in another language. 
 Another issue is that in my initial findings from middle phase I constructed (though not 
very different and impossible to determine the significance level) shows the opposite of my 
hypotheses, where the final phase is the most alike, followed by the beginning phase, followed 
by the middle phase. It can be surmised that the problems with the distribution of the data, with 
the enormous gap in between the middle two eight session segments that made up the middle 
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phase, explain the lack of similarity in these sessions. However, the findings that the final stage 
were more similar than the beginning leads to some interesting questions, suggesting that the 
final segment shows more cohesion than the beginning. Another possibility is simply that the 
analysis itself was a failure.  
Another limit is the lack of external measures of any sort including symptom change, 
level of object relations, or interpersonal relatedness measures. There is no measure of patient 
change and the only evidence of change comes from the sessions themselves in her change in 
pronoun usage. As there are no valid external measures used, it is also difficult to tell whether 
the patient’s mental health improved or not during the course of the analysis. However, as there 
are no external measures, it leaves open the door that some unknown factor-such as the passage 
of time-influenced and improved the patient’s mental health rather than the interpretation and 
resolution of the transference. Furthermore, there are some significant limits in the limited 
sampling of the 48 sessions used in this analysis. The true therapeutic transformations may have 
occurred in other sessions that were not studied, and the tendencies observed may not have been 
observed if the entirety of the 324 sessions were used.  
A further confounder is that the frame of the treatment changes, something observed in 
the text of the data itself. Session 271 is the first mention of the switch to a twice a week 
treatment, and it is not until session 324 that the analyst makes a reference to the patient sitting 
rather than laying down. It is unclear when these changes in the frame occur. This may confound 
ideas about the changes in “I” seen in the graph, as less time and not laying down may 
theoretically influence the transference relationship and may account for some of the changes 
seen in the graph rather than reflecting an intrapsychic or interpersonal change in the patient. 
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Maybe the patient improved because she was in less analysis, rather than any action on the part 
of the analysis itself.  
 
Future directions for research 
While a randomized study seems difficult, a movement towards quantitative confirmation 
of these findings would be beneficial. A possibility for further research would be to perform a 
double blind study of other therapeutic transcripts. It would seem that those transcripts that 
showed no improvement would likely conform to the “Low I” type use of language. It would 
seem likely that those using “we” or I at a lower rate would mean that the patient is more able to 
enter treatment, while those that use I at a higher rate might be more resistant. Randomized 
control trial of therapeutic transcripts to see if using this language can predict therapeutic success 
or failure.  Further, it might be interesting, given the findings with pronouns of the patient, to 
examine the pronouns of the analyst in helping to identify interventions and potential 
“attunement.”  
Another direction for possible research may involve an examination of multiple 
psychotherapies looking at the language associated with Low I and High I sessions. The 
language associated with a genetic transferential self-state in the way that Scala and Levy (2012) 
define it, may look like this: High I, high you, high mostly negative affect, low we, low 
he/she/they, and high negation. The language of identification may be low I, high we, high he 
she they. For future research, if this is the case, then hypothetically language associated with 
High I use would be correlated with other words in High I sessions, while words in Low I 
sessions would be negatively correlated to language associated with High I sessions and 
positively correlated with other language in Low I sessions.  
103 
 
Finally, another area of further study would be to explore how the analyst’s use of 
pronouns influences the patient’s use of pronouns. In looking at the analyst’s pronoun use, for 
example, in some of the interpretations he makes, he seems to use the form “you are doing this.” 
It would be interesting to see if there is a relationship between his use of pronouns and the 
patient’s use of pronouns.  
 
Conclusion 
I’ve found something that contributes to the study of transference and to the study of the 
process of therapy. Pronouns matter in the course of a psychoanalysis, as they do in Campbell 
and Pennebaker’s (2001) research. This use is unconscious, but may give us clues in further 
research about what type of intervention to make when. It would seem, in the study of this 
particular analysis, that there is a time and place for transference interpretations.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 6. 
Correlations Beginning Phase For LIWC Function Words Category 
 
Segment
1 
func11 
Segment 
1.2 
func12 func21 func22 
Spearman's rho func11 Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 -.182 .036 -.173 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .210 .805 .234 
N 49 49 49 49 
func12 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.182 1.000 -.445** .038 
Sig. (2-tailed) .210 . .001 .794 
N 49 49 49 49 
func21 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.036 -.445** 1.000 .039 
Sig. (2-tailed) .805 .001 . .790 
N 49 49 49 49 
func22 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.173 .038 .039 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .234 .794 .790 . 
N 49 49 49 49 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Mean score for beginning phase: -.182+.036+-.173+-.445+.038+.039=-.687/6=-0.1145 
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Table 7. 
Correlations Middle Phase LIWC Function Words Category 
 func31 func32 func41 func42 
Spearman's rho func31 Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .041 -.267 -.188 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .795 .083 .228 
N 43 43 43 43 
func32 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.041 1.000 -.131 .130 
Sig. (2-tailed) .795 . .402 .405 
N 43 43 43 43 
func41 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.267 -.131 1.000 -.076 
Sig. (2-tailed) .083 .402 . .630 
N 43 43 43 43 
func42 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.188 .130 -.076 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .228 .405 .630 . 
N 43 43 43 43 
Mean score for Middle phase: 0.041+-.267+-.188+-.131+.130+-.076=-.491/6=-0.0818 
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Table 8. 
Correlations End Phase LIWC Function Words Category 
 func51 func52 func61 func62 
Spearman's rho func51 Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 -.206 -.083 -.165 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .208 .617 .323 
N 39 39 39 38 
func52 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.206 1.000 .271 .028 
Sig. (2-tailed) .208 . .095 .866 
N 39 39 39 38 
func61 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.083 .271 1.000 -.074 
Sig. (2-tailed) .617 .095 . .659 
N 39 39 39 38 
func62 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.165 .028 -.074 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .323 .866 .659 . 
N 38 38 38 38 
Mean score for end phase: -.206+-.083+-.165+.271+.028+-.074=-.229/6=-0.0382 
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Table 9. 
Correlations Beginning Phase for LIWC “I” Category  
 i11 i12 i21 i22 
Spearman's rho i11 Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .077 .090 .203 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .597 .540 .161 
N 49 49 49 49 
i12 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.077 1.000 .131 -.035 
Sig. (2-tailed) .597 . .368 .810 
N 49 49 49 49 
i21 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.090 .131 1.000 .319* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .540 .368 . .025 
N 49 49 49 49 
i22 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.203 -.035 .319* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .161 .810 .025 . 
N 49 49 49 49 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Mean score for beginning phase: 0.077+.090+.203+.131+-.035+.319=.785/6=0.1308 
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Table 10. 
Correlations Middle Phase for LIWC “I” Category  
 i31 i32 i41 i42 
Spearman's rho i31 Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 -.038 -.332* .042 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .808 .029 .788 
N 43 43 43 43 
i32 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.038 1.000 .142 -.025 
Sig. (2-tailed) .808 . .363 .871 
N 43 43 43 43 
i41 Correlation 
Coefficient 
-.332* .142 1.000 .128 
Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .363 . .412 
N 43 43 43 43 
i42 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.042 -.025 .128 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .788 .871 .412 . 
N 43 43 43 43 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Mean score for middle phase: -.038+-.332+.042+.142+-.025+.128=-.083/6=-0.0138 
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Table 11. 
Correlations End Phase for LIWC “I” Category 
 i51 i52 i61 i62 
Spearman's rho i51 Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 .074 .243 .043 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .656 .137 .797 
N 39 39 39 38 
i52 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.074 1.000 .103 .250 
Sig. (2-tailed) .656 . .533 .129 
N 39 39 39 38 
i61 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.243 .103 1.000 .327* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .137 .533 . .045 
N 39 39 39 38 
i62 Correlation 
Coefficient 
.043 .250 .327* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .797 .129 .045 . 
N 38 38 38 38 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Mean score for end phase: 0.074+.243+.043+.103+.250+.327=1.04/6=0.1733 
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